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Introduction: 
The Economic and Monetary Union of Europe is currently under pressure. As the dust of the 
financial crisis is currently setting, Greece saw a hard-left swing of the government in the 
beginning of 2015, winning on the back of an anti-austerity campaign.1 Greece is currently 
trying to find a consensus on the payback of lending’s with the troika, representing a group 
bailout creditors consisting of the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF, but it is not 
the only euro country facing economic difficulties. Since the launch of the single European 
currency, mutual fiscal performances have been mixed.  
 In order to impose fiscal discipline on the Eurozone candidates, the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) was implemented in 1997, reflecting a full set of fiscal rules and several 
monitoring- and correction mechanisms on a supranational level. However, after two rounds 
of reforms in 2003-2005 and 2010-2011, scepticism prevails. The latest reforms continue to 
reflect an unwillingness of member states to transfer the necessary degree of sovereignty over 
macro-fiscal objectives to the European level mirroring the need of further political 
integration.2  
 While these observations helps put the current tensions into perspective, they cannot 
explain why member states have been showing mixed results while being subjected to the 
same external constraints.3 This research will try to seek answers to this question. Where 
problems occur on a supranational level due to the lack of political integration, there is a need 
for increased monitoring on a national level. The Economic and Monetary Union of Europe is 
in essence a two-way relationship. In the end, the increased fiscal imbalances in the euro area 
as a whole and the current critical situation in some of the member states, risk undermining 
stability, growth and employment, as well as the sustainability of the EMU itself.4  
  
 
 
 
                                                             
1 ‘’ Greece's left-wing government meets Eurozone reality’’, aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/02/greece-left-
wing-government-meets-eurozone-reality-150205082726219.html, consulted at 23-02-2015. 
2 L. Schuknecht et.al. ‘’ The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform’’, ECB Occasional Papers No. 129 
(2011), 5. 
3 M. Buti, S. Eiffinger and D. Franco, ‘’ Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal 
adjustment?’’, Economic Papers No. 180 (2003), I. 
4 L. Schuknecht et.al. ‘’ The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform’’, 5. 
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Chapter one: Outline of the research.  
The starting point of the EMU in 1990 showed a divergent fiscal record for the euro 
candidates. With the ratification of Maastricht in 1992, countries spurred into action in order 
to meet the deficit criterion. The Maastricht Treaty had in some way a positive effect on fiscal 
consolidation.5  Just two years before the implementation of the euro, in 1997, the SGP was 
adopted with the aim to ensure budgetary discipline among the Eurozone. Surprisingly, under 
this new set of rules, the ‘positive effect’ of Maastricht seemed to evaporate. 6 
 Fiscal discipline and flexibility are the main principles of budgetary policy in a 
monetary union. Where fiscal discipline should allow the credibility of monetary policy to 
strengthen, flexibility is needed in order to deal with country-specific shocks. Unfortunately, 
the SGP could not adhere to its promises.7 It has been criticized for various reasons. 
According to M. Buti et al. (2003), there are six main lines of criticism to be found. The SGP 
is supposed to: ‘’reduce budgetary flexibility, work asymmetrically, does not sanction 
politically-motivated fiscal policies, discourages public investment, disregards the aggregate 
fiscal stance, focuses on short term commitments and disregards structural reforms.’’8  
As a consequence, the SGP has been reformed to address its design flaws. In 2005, EU 
lawmakers amended the SGP to allow it to better consider individual circumstances and to 
add more economic rationale to the rules to which member states have to adhere to.9 
However, despite the reform of 2005, the financial crisis has unmasked several member states 
with shortcomings on a domestic level. They adapted to the requirements of the SGP on the 
surface while maintaining the legacy of past fiscal profligacy, weak domestic fiscal 
frameworks and engaged in creative accounting and ‘one-offs’ (V. Koen and P. van den 
Noord, 2005; A. Annett, 2006; Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2007;).  
Due to the financial crisis, fiscal governance now has gained a prominent role in the 
policy debate.10 The shortcomings on a national level have led to an increased attention within 
                                                             
5 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, IMF Working Paper 06/116 (2006), 8. 
6 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact, 8. 
7 M. Buti, D. Franco and H. Ongena, ‘’ Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact’’, Oxford review of economic policy Vol. 14:3 (1998), 81. 
8 M. Buti, S. Eiffinger and D. Franco, ‘’ Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal 
adjustment?’’, Economic Papers No. 180 (2003), 9. 
9 ‘’Stability and Growth Pact’’, ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm, 
consulted at 04-03-2015. 
10 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘’ National fiscal governance reforms across EU 
Member State: Analysis of the information contained in the 2009 2010 Stability and Convergence 
Programmes’’, European Economy Occasional Papers No. 67 (2010), 5. 
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the academic sphere. A consensus exists that a sound governance framework is a prerequisite 
for successful and sustainable fiscal policies in EMU and that a ’quantum leap’ in this regard 
is needed.11 This is also recognized by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN 
Council), who recognized that ‘’ important flanking policies to the fiscal exit will include 
strengthened national budgetary frameworks for underpinning the credibility of consolidation 
strategies and measures to support long-term fiscal sustainability.’’12  
It is therefore ever important to engage in research that tell us why certain member 
states perform better than others. While before the crisis, much of the criticism is aimed at the 
Pact itself, SGP reforms are currently asking for time consistent national policies, individual 
budgetary transparency and ownership of the Pact.13 This brings me to the following research 
question: Can the divergent results of the SGP be explained by weaknesses in the national 
budgetary frameworks of the member states? Also, due to the existing degree of political 
integration in the EMU, is internal adjustment rather than attempting to re-design the rules 
from scratch a more suitable way to bring about progress?14 
In order to give answers to these questions, this research will start by analysing results 
of the past SGP-period. In order to categorize the performances of the Member States, chapter 
two will focus on the results of the Member States during three periods of time:  
First, the post-Maastricht period starting from 1993 until the implementation of the 
euro in 1999. This period must be taken into account because many scholars have recognized 
a ‘genuine consolidation effort’ by the Member States.15 The second period will analyse the 
results of the Member States between 1999 and 2005. Due to a recession most of the EMU 
countries saw their fiscal positions deteriorate which eventually led to a ‘compliance crises’ in 
2003. Despite the European Commission’s recommendation to take action, the ECOFIN 
Council decided to suspend the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany.16 
This crisis eventually led to a revision of the SGP in 2005. The third period will reflect the 
                                                             
11 L. Schuknecht et.al. ‘’ The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform’’, 13. 
12 The Council of the European Union, ‘’Press release’’, Council meeting 2967 (2009). 
13 A. Annett, J. Decressin and M. Deppler, ‘’Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact’’, IMF Policy Discussion 
Paper No. 2 (2005), 1. 
14 M. Buti, S. Eiffinger and D. Franco, ‘’ Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal 
adjustment?’’, 2. 
15 M. Buti, ‘’Will the new Stability and Growth Pact succeed? An Economic and Political Perspective’’, 
European Economy Economic Papers No. 241 (2006), 5. 
16 J. de Haan, H. Berger and D. Jansen, ‘’ Why has the Stability and Growth Pact Failed?’’, International 
Finance 7:2 (2004), 236. 
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period from 2005 until 2013, the year with the latest known figures according to Eurostat.17 
Although the period prior to 2007 entailed a renewed improvement of the overall fiscal 
balances in the Eurozone, when the financial crisis erupted, member states were distinctly ill-
prepared. 
During the Eurozone crisis the term ‘PI(I)GS’ gained traction as an acronym for a 
group of countries worst hit by the financial crisis: Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, Greece and 
Spain.18 But even before the crisis, the literature observed another pattern of wrongdoers: in 
the early years of the millennium, scholars noted a gap between the ‘large’ and the ‘small’ 
countries. Starting with the analysis of general observations, chapter two will therefore outline 
the available literature on these structural patterns. How can we explain these divergent 
results? Why do these member states show a considerable underperformance?  
There are well-grounded theories and evidence to suggest that governments do not 
always have the right incentives to pursue an appropriate fiscal course. According to R. 
Morris (2006), ‘’ the primary rationale for fiscal rules such as those prescribed by the SGP 
relates to the observation that, unless restrained in some way, fiscal policies are prone to 
deficit and spending biases.’’19 Consequently, the current literature provides many 
instruments who have the potential to contribute to fiscal sustainability. Chapter three will 
provide an overview. Starting by exploring the sources of the deficit and spending biases of 
governments, the ultimate aim of this chapter is to analyse key components that make up a 
resilient fiscal framework.  
Now that the key components are reflected, chapter four will engage in a comparative 
research using key indicators on fiscal governance. The analyses will focus on the link 
between the strength and/or existence of the instruments of chapter three and the structural 
results of chapter two. The results of this chapter will be checked by two case studies in 
chapter five, where a well-performer as well as a wrongdoer will be analysed in an in-depth 
review. Can we explain the divergent results under the Stability and Growth Pact by looking 
at the strength of domestic fiscal frameworks?  
                                                             
17 Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables, consulted at 08-03-2015.  
18 The London school of economics and political science, ‘’ The ‘PIIGS’ acronym had a clear negative impact on 
the response of financial markets to the ‘PIIGS countries’ during the crisis’’, 
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/12/12/the-piigs-acronym-had-a-clear-negative-impact-on-the-market-treatment-
of-the-piigs-countries-during-the-crisis/, consulted at 04-02-2015. 
19 R. Morris et.al. ‘’ The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’’, European Central Bank 
Occasional Paper Series No. 47 (2006), 5-6. 
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Chapter two: Analysing the results of the past.  
2.1: Analysing the period of post-Maastricht until the implementation of the Euro (1993-
1999). 
The Maastricht Treaty is special. For the first time (although broader budgetary agreements 
could already be seen in the United States) the Treaty of Maastricht created an international 
budgetary treaty where each country had to converge to the same targets.20 According to the 
Delors Report (1989), the monetary union could be achieved in three stages. The last stage 
(1999-onwards) was focused on the fix of final exchange rates and the transition to the euro.21 
In order to qualify for the third stage, Member States could apply for admission if they 
fulfilled the following convergence criteria: 
1. An annual inflation rate of no more than 1.5 per cent above the three best inflation 
performers in the EU. 
2. A planned or actual budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) of no more than three per 
cent.  
3. A government debt to GDP ratio of sixty per cent or less.  
4. An average long term interest rate at most of two hundred basis points above the 
levels observed in the three countries with the best inflation performance. 
5. No devaluations or revaluations of the exchange rates within two years preceding 
accession.22   
The biggest stumbling blocks for the EMU candidates were supposed to be the fiscal criteria, 
most notably the debt ratio. 23 The focus on results will therefore be at the general 
deficit/surplus24 and the general government gross debt25 compared with point 2 and 3 of the 
convergence criteria of Maastricht. The performance of the Euro opt-out countries Denmark 
and UK, and future Euro-candidate Sweden are also taken into account since they also have to 
adhere to the EMU limits on governance finance. Table one and two shows the results of 
EMU candidates from 1993-1998.  
                                                             
20 J.D. Savage, ‘’ Budgetary Collective Action Problems: Convergence and Compliance under the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union’’, Public Administration Review Vol 61:1 (2001), 43. 
21 ‘’Phase 3: The Delors Report’’, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/emu/road/delors_report_en.htm, 
consulted at 17-02-2015.  
22 J.E. McKay, ‘’Evaluating the EMU criteria: Theoretical constructs, Member compliance and Empirical 
testing’’, Kyklos Vol 50:1 (1997), 65. 
23 J.E. McKay, ‘’Evaluating the EMU criteria: Theoretical constructs, Member compliance and Empirical 
testing’’, 70. 
24 General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (–) as percentage of GDP. 
25 General government consolidated gross debt, as percentage of GDP. 
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Table 1: General deficit/surplus of the EMU, 1993-1998. 
 
Table 2: General government gross debt, 1993-1998.  
 
Sources:   
(1) European Commission, ‘’Convergence Report of the European Commission, 1998.’’, European Economy No. 65 
(1998), 81.  
(2) Eurostat, ‘’ Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data’’, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-
statistics/data/main-tables, consulted at 09-03-2015. 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996(1) 1996(2) 1997(1) 1997(2) 1998(*)(1) 1998(2) 
B -7.1 -4.9 -3.9 -3.2 -4 -2.1 -2.3 -1.7 -1.0 
DK -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 -0.7 -2.5 0.7 -1.2 1.1 -0.4 
D -3.2 -2.4 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -2.7 -2.8 -2.5 -2.4 
EL -13.8 -10.0 -10.3 -7.5 -9.1 -4.0 -6.7 -2.2 -6.0 
E -6.9 -6.3 -7.3 -4.6 -5.4 -2.6 -3.9 -2.2 -2.9 
F -5.8 -5.8 -4.9 -4.1 -3.9 -3.0 -3.6 -2.9 -2.4 
IRL -2.7 -1.7 -2.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.9 1.3 1.1 2.0 
I -9.5 -9.2 -7.7 -6.7 -6.6 -3.7 -3.0 -2.5 -3.0 
L 1.7 2.8 1.9 2.5 1.3 1.7 3.8 1.0 3.6 
NL -3.2 -3.8 -4.0 -2.3 -1.7 -1.4 -1.3 -1.6 -0.9 
A -4.2 -5.0 -5.2 -4.0 -4.4 -2.5 -2.4 -2.3 -2.7 
P -6.1 -6.0 -5.7 -3.2 -4.7 -2.5 -3.7 -2.2 -4.4 
FIN -8.0 -6.4 -4.7 -3.3 -3.2 -0.9 -1.2 -0.3 1.6 
S -12.2 -10.3 -6.9 -3.5 -3.1 -0.8 -1.6 -0.5 0.9 
UK -7.9 -6.8 -5.5 -4.8 -4.1 -1.9 -2.1 -0.6 -0.2 
EU-15 
(average) -6.1 -5.2 -4.8 -3.3 -3.7 -2.4 -2.0 -1.9 -1.2 
 1993 1994 1995 1996(1) 1996(2) 1997(1) 1997(2) 1998 (1) 1998 (2) 
B 135.2 133.5 131.3 126.9 128.5 122.2 123.8 118.1 118.8 
DK 81.6 78.1 73.3 70.6 69.7 65.1 65.7 59.5 61.2 
D 48 50.2 58 60.4 57.4 61.3 58.6 61.2 59.3 
EL 111.6 109.3 110.1 111.6 113.1 108.7 109.7 107.7 107.9 
E 60 62.6 65.5 70.1 65.6 68.8 64.4 67.4 62.5 
F 45.3 48.5 52.7 55.7 59.4 58 60.8 58.1 60.8 
IRL 96.3 89.1 82.3 72.7 70 66.3 61.7 59.5 51.6 
I 119.1 124.9 124.2 124 116.3 121.6 113.7 118.1 110.8 
L 6.1 5.7 5.9 6.6 8 6.7 7.9 7.1 7.6 
NL 81.2 77.9 79.1 77.2 71.8 72.1 66.0 70.0 62.7 
A 62.7 65.4 69.2 69.5 68 66.1 42.3 64.7 63.8 
P 63.1 63.8 65.9 65 59.5 62 55.2 60.0 51.8 
FIN 58 59.6 58.1 57.6 55.3 55.8 52.2 53.6 46.9 
S 75.8 79 77.6 76.7 70.3 76.6 68.2 74.1 66.7 
UK 48.5 50.5 53.9 54.7 47.9 53.4 46.9 52.3 44.2 
EU-15 
(average)  65.9 68 71 73 70.72 72.1 66.5 70.5 65.1 
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One year before the launch of the Euro, table one indicates that the budget deficit criteria 
of 3 per cent is achieved by all the Member States, where the overall EU deficit had fallen 
from an average of -6.1 per cent in 1993 to a -1.9 per cent in 1998. At least, according to the 
Convergence Report of the European Commission (1998). From 1996, tables one and two 
show values from two separate sources. Several figures were later revised by Eurostat. V. 
Koen and P. van den Noord (2005) write that during Maastricht and the SGP, several 
countries engaged in so-called ‘one-offs’ and ‘creative accounting and fiscal gimmicks’. The 
ex-post adjustments of fiscal data for Portugal and Greece can be contributed to these 
observations.26 Still, in comparison with 1993, the Member States preformed relatively well in 
bringing down their deficits.  
 This was however not the case for government debt. Table two shows that a large 
group of EMU countries did not achieve the 60 per cent debt limit. Furthermore, the EU-15 
average debt remains fairly constant during the run up to the Euro. This was however 
considered not to be a problem. These budgetary ceilings were in no terms absolute. The 
Treaty refers to the convergence criteria as ‘reference values’. It envisioned that a country 
could still qualify for membership if the level of deficit and debt as a per cent of GDP “has 
declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference 
value.”27 If the convergence criteria of Maastricht were applied in a strictly manner, only a 
few countries would qualify for the euro. In practice, only Greece did not manage to qualify 
in 1997 but introduced the Euro in 2001 instead.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 V. Koen and P. van den Noord, ‘’ Fiscal gimmickry in Europe: One-off measures and creative accounting’’, 
OECD Economic Department Working Papers No. 417 (2005), 10. 
27 J.D. Savage, ‘’ Budgetary Collective Action Problems: Convergence and Compliance under the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union’’, 45. 
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2.2: Analysing the results. The first years after the implementation of the SGP (1999-
2004). 
In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was implemented to supplement the framework 
of Maastricht. Based on the concept of ‘multilateral surveillance’ as established in the 
Maastricht Treaty28, the SGP was designed to prevent- and correct excessive government 
deficits to ensure that the fiscal policies of the Member States support the smooth functioning 
of the EMU.29 In order to put constraint on the budgetary targets, a ‘preventive arm’ was 
implemented to bind the commitment of governments to sound fiscal policies. This arm 
requires member states to submit annual stability programs to the European Commission and 
ECOFIN Council, indicating how they plan to achieve or safeguard sound fiscal positions in 
order to meet their budgetary targets. When member states fail to reach these targets and 
excessive deficits or public debt levels are established by the ECOFIN council, a ‘corrective 
arm’ ensures correction trough a step-by-step approach, also known as the ‘Excessive Deficit 
Procedure’ (EDP). Failure to correct these deficits may ultimately lead to sanctioning, 
including fines of up to 0.2 or 0.5 per cent of the national GDP.30  
 Although the fiscal performances improved on the way to the euro, Europe was hit by 
a recession in the early 2000’s. Regarding the government deficits, table three shows mixed 
results. Deficits started to rise in several Euro countries from 2000, most notably in Germany, 
Greece, France, Italy, Austria, and Portugal.31 By the end of 2004, only half of the euro 
countries (Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Finland)32 had fiscal 
positions defined as ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’, with a minimum ½ percent cyclically 
adjusted deficit.33  
The government debt levels of table four also shows divergent trajectories. The 
original high debt countries, Belgium, Greece and Italy were still far over the 60 per cent debt 
ceiling in 2004, although Belgium was able to consolidate substantially during the period of 
1999-2004. This was also the case for Italy, Portugal and Austria, only not as much. A 
                                                             
28 Art 121, TFEU. 
29 R. Morris et.al. ‘’ The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’’, 5. 
30 For more information on these procedures, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm, consulted at 05-03-2015. 
31 The same is applicable for the UK. 
32 The same is applicable for Sweden and Denmark. 
33 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, 9. 
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decrease in debt could further be seen in Spain, Ireland, The Netherlands and Finland. In 
contrary to these countries both Germany and France saw their debt increasing.  
As a consequence of the growing deficits due to the recession, six countries were 
pushed into the EDP. Portugal in 2001, Germany and France in 2002, Greece and the 
Netherlands in 2003, and Italy in 2004.34 However, despite the European Commission’s 
recommendation to take action, the ECOFIN Council decided in their meeting of 25 
November 2003 to suspend the excessive deficit procedure against France and Germany.35 
This was later declared by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to be an inadmissible, since it 
was not preceded by a Commission proposal. Still, due to political pressure, the EDP was 
formally suspended in December 2004. ‘It turned out that the Pact’s Achilles heel was its 
weak enforcement provisions.’’36 
Table 3: General deficit/surplus of the EMU, 1999-2004. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
B -0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -1.8 -0.2 
DK 0.9 1.9 1.1 0.0 -0.1 2.1 
D -1.5 1.0 -3.1 -3.9 -4.1 -3.7 
EL -3.2 -3.7 -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 
E -1.3 -1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 
F -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 -3.1 -3.9 -3.5 
IRL 2.4 4.8 0.9 -0.3 0.4 1.4 
I -1.8 -1.3 -3.4 -3.1 -3.4 -3.6 
L 3.6 5.7 6 2.3 0.6 -1 
NL 0.3 1.9 -0.4 -2.1 -3 -1.8 
A -2.6 -2.1 -0.6 -1.3 -1.7 -4.8 
P -3 -3.2 -4.8 -3.3 -4.4 -6.2 
FIN 1.7 6.9 5 4.1 2.4 2.2 
S 0.8 3.2 1.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.3 
UK 0.8 1.2 0.4 -2 -3.4 -3.6 
EU-15 (average) -1.4 0 -1.9 -2.6 -3.1 -2.9 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
34 ‘’The corrective 
arm,’’ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/corrective_arm/index_en.htm, consulted at 19-
02-2015. 
35 J. de Haan, H. Berger and D. Jansen, ‘’ Why has the Stability and Growth Pact Failed?’’, 236. 
36 L. Schuknecht et.al., ‘’The Stability and Growth pact: Crisis and reform’’, 9. 
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Table 4: General government gross debt, 1999-2004. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
B 114.7 109.1 107.8 104.9 101.3 96.6 
DK 57.7 52.4 48.5 49.1 46.2 44.2 
D 59.9 58.7 57.5 59.2 62.9 64.6 
EL 94 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 
E 60.9 58 54.2 51.3 47.6 45.3 
F 60 58.4 57.9 59.8 63.9 65.5 
IRL 46.7 36.3 33.4 30.7 30.1 28.3 
I 109.6 105.1 104.7 101.9 100.4 100 
L 6.7 6.1 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.5 
NL 58.5 51.3 48.8 48.3 49.4 50 
A 66.4 65.9 66.5 66.3 65.5 64.8 
P 51 50.3 53.4 56.2 58.7 62 
FIN 44.1 42.5 41 40.2 42.8 42.7 
S 61.5 51.3 51.8 49.9 49.1 47.9 
UK 41.9 39.1 36.2 35.9 37.3 40.2 
EU-15 (average)  62.2 59.2 58.1 57.5 57.3 57.1 
 
Source: Eurostat, ‘’ Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data’’, 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables, consulted at 09-03-2015. 
2.3: Analysing the results. The SGP reform of 2005 and the sovereign debt crisis (2005-
2013). 
As a response to this ‘compliance crisis’, the ECOFIN Council agreed on a reform of the SGP 
in 2005. This reform was aimed to increase countries’ ownership of the Pact. First, the 
‘medium-term objectives’ were made more country specific in terms of debt and growth 
dynamics. Second, several procedural reforms were made in the preventive arm that 
resembled a shift towards more sophisticated rules. Third, the corrective arm has been made 
more flexible.37 These reforms however, did not entail a fundamental change of the Pact. 
Instead, the 2005 reform introduced greater discretion, leniency and political control into the 
procedures.38 
Despite this observation, the period prior to 2007 entailed a renewed improvement of 
the overall fiscal balances in the Eurozone. The average euro deficit of the EU-15 countries 
declined to a surplus of 0.1 percent as seen in table five. Still, ‘’these improvements were 
modest in cyclically adjusted terms’’.39 This can be explained due to strong growth and 
                                                             
37 For more information on the SGP reforms read: R. Morris et.al. ‘’The reform and implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact’’, 41. 
38 L. Schuknecht et.al. ‘’The Stability and Growth pact: Crisis and reform’’, 10. 
39 Ibidem, 12. 
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buoyant revenues caused by a boom in the real estate markets which helped to mask the 
expansionary expenditure policies in a number of countries. Countries like France, Portugal 
and the UK remained close to the 3 per cent limit in 2007, while fiscal policies were broadly 
relaxed. Lastly, the average government debt declined only marginally during the first nine 
years of the Euro, with an average debt standing at 53.7 per cent of GDP for the EU-15 
countries in 2007 (table six).  
The period between 1999 and 2007, can in retrospect be characterised as ‘wasted good 
times’. There was little progress towards sound public finances, while the credibility of the 
fiscal rules were compromised.40 When the financial crisis erupted in 2007, member states 
were distinctly ill-prepared. Public finances started to deteriorate significantly. 41 Starting with 
the announcement of the Greek government revealing its 12.5 per cent deficit ratio in October 
2009, liquidity in the financial markets started to dry up. Risk premiums started to increase in 
Greece as a consequence of its fiscal imbalances and trading in Greek debt came to a 
standstill. In a chain reaction, the same happened over time for Ireland and Portugal. Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) and government bond spreads started to move in tandem.42 As a 
consequence, banks started to tighten the lending’s as customers withdrew support and banks 
experienced increasing funding difficulties. Countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal were 
forced to seek financial support.43 
In response to the financial crisis, governments started to adopt a range of measures in 
order to stabilise the financial sector and the overall economic activity. In the EU, a European 
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was launched by the European Commission, foreseeing a 
short-term budgetary stimulus. This came on top of the effect of automatic fiscal stabilisers.44 
As a consequence, the average deficit started to increase to 7.5 percent whereas the average 
government debt rose to 74.3 percent in 2010. The fiscal costs of this sovereign debt crisis 
turned out to be high. These costs accumulated ‘’ through a combination of ﬁnancial sector 
rescues, forfeited revenues owing to depressed activity and, more secondarily, discretionary 
counter-cyclical ﬁscal impulse to lessen the downturn.’’45  
                                                             
40 Ibidem, 10. 
41 Ibidem, 12. 
42 P. Rother et.al. More gain than pain, consolidating the public finances (London: Politeia, 2011), 14. 
43 L.Schuknecht et.al., ‘’The Stability and Growth pact: Crisis and reform’’, 12. 
44 Ibidem, 12. 
45 M. Buti and N. Carnot, ‘’ The EMU Debt Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms’’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies Vol 50:6 (2012), 905. 
16 
 
Due to the financial crisis, the policy framework of the EMU has been addressed 
(again) in order to tackle initial gaps in the EMU architecture. The first set of reforms entered 
into force at the end of 2011, also known as the ‘Six-Pack’ followed by a ‘Two-Pack’ and a 
‘Fiscal compact’. Where the SGP reform of 2005 called for increasing flexibility, these new 
set of rules are aimed at strengthening the adherence to the SGP trough the improvement of 
monitoring tools and EU’s economic governance rules in order to reinforce economic 
coordination between member states.46  
Table 5: General deficit/surplus of the EMU, 2005-2013.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
46 ‘’Stability and Growth Pact, ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm, 
consulted at 09-03-2015. 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
B -2.6 0.3 0.0 -1.1 -5.5 -4.0 -3.9 -4.1 -2.9 
DK 5.0 5.0 5.0 3.2 -2.8 -2.7 -2.1 -3.9 -0.7 
D -3.3 -1.5 0.3 0.0 -3.0 -4.1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 
EL -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.7 -11.1 -10.1 -8.6 
E 1.2 2.2 2.0 -4.4 -11 -9.4 -9.4 -10.3 -6.8 
F -3.2 -2.3 -2.5 -3.2 -7.2 -6.8 -5.1 -4.9 -4.1 
IRL 1.6 2.8 0.2 -7.0 -13.9 -32.4 -12.6 -8.0 -5.7 
I -4.2 -3.6 -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 -4.2 -3.5 -3.0 -2.8 
L 0.2 1.4 4.2 3.3 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 
NL -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.5 -5.0 -4.3 -4.0 -2.3 
A -2.5 -2.5 -1.3 -1.5 -5.3 -4.5 -2.6 -2.3 -1.5 
P -6.2 -4.3 -3.0 -3.8 -9.8 -11.2 -7.4 -5.5 -4.9 
FIN 2.6 3.9 5.1 4.2 -2.5 -2.6 -1.0 -2.1 -2.4 
S 1.8 2.2 3.3 2.0 -0.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -1.3 
UK -3.5 -2.9 -3.0 -5.1 -10.8 -9.6 -7.6 -8.3 -5.8 
EU-15 
(average)  -1.4 -0.3 0.2 -1.5 -6.2 -7.5 -4.8 -4.5 -3.3 
17 
 
Table 6: General government gross debt, 2005-2013. 
 
Source: Eurostat, ‘’ Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data’’, 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables, consulted at 09-03-2015. 
2.4: General observations by the literature 
The literature stipulates several reasons why member states lost an adherence impetus after 
the implementation of the Euro in 2002. Where all the Member States were able to bring their 
deficits down under the 3 per cent ceiling by 1998, six countries where pushed into the EDP 
by 2004. It turned out that the threat of not being allowed into the Eurozone was the 
underlying reason for the positive ‘Maastricht effect’.  
Conditionality for the Eurozone relied on the attraction of membership and its 
perceived benefits, with membership criteria functioning as a set of external constraints for 
aspirant members (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996).47 Accordingly, Von Hagen (2005) 
concludes in his empirical research that ‘’ (…) the Maastricht process did create some 
political pressure of its own on the governments to undertake fiscal consolidations, and this 
pressure was effective mainly in the first half of the 1990s.’’48 It has therefore been argued 
that the slowdown of overall results under the first years of the SGP can be contributed to an 
                                                             
47 S. Blavoukos and G. Pagoulatos, ‘’ Fiscal Adjustment in Southern Europe: the Limits of EMU 
Conditionality’’, GreeSE Paper No 12 (2008), 6. 
48 J. Von Hagen et.al. , ‘’ Budgetary Consolidation in EMU’’, Centre for economic policy research economic 
papers No. 148 (2001), 39. 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
B 94.8 90.8 86.9 92.2 99.3 99.6 102.1 104 104.5 
DK 37.4 31.5 27.3 33.4 40.4 42.9 46.4 45.6 45.0 
D 66.8 66.3 63.5 64.9 72.4 80.3 77.6 79.0 76.9 
EL 98.6 100.0 106.1 105.4 112.9 129.7 146 171.3 156.9 
E 42.3 38.9 35.5 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.2 84.4 92.1 
F 67.0 64.2 64.2 67.8 78.8 81.5 85.0 89.2 92.2 
IRL 26.2 23.8 24.0 42.6 62.2 87.4 111.1 121.7 123.3 
I 101.9 102.5 99.7 102.3 112.5 115.3 116.4 122.2 127.9 
L 6.3 7.0 7.2 14.4 15.5 19.6 18.5 21.4 23.6 
NL 68.3 67.0 64.8 68.5 79.7 82.4 82.1 81.7 81.2 
A 49.4 44.9 42.7 54.8 56.5 59.0 61.3 66.5 68.6 
P 67.4 69.2 68.4 71.7 83.6 96.2 111.1 124.8 128.0 
FIN 40.0 38.2 34.0 32.7 41.7 47.1 48.5 53.0 56.0 
S 48.2 43.2 38.2 36.8 40.3 36.7 36.1 36.4 38.6 
UK 41.5 42.5 43.6 51.6 65.9 76.4 81.9 85.8 87.2 
EU-15 
(average)  57.1 55.3 53.7 58.6 67.6 74.3 79.6 85.8 86.8 
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‘adjustment fatigue’ since the imminent threat of exclusion from the Euro had passed for the 
Eurozone countries (Hughes-Hallet, Lewis and von Hagen, 2004; von Hagen, 2005). 
 Another popular view is that the constraints of the SGP had a significant effect on the 
ability of Member States to conduct effective counter-cyclical stabilization policy. In return, 
some scholars have argued that fiscal policies actually became more procyclical after the 
introduction of the euro, ‘’especially as countries loosened in good times’’ (Debrun and 
Faruqee, 2004; Balassone and Francese, 2004). This argument is however subjected to debate 
within the academic sphere (J. Gali and R. Perotti, 2003; A. Annett and A. Jeager, 2004).49 
Nevertheless, procyclical fiscal policies were still vivid during the SGP. A key failing of the 
SGP in its early years was its inability to prompt countries to adjust during the periods of high 
growth, where numerous countries loosened during good-times and conducted countercyclical 
policies during downturns.50  
One reason for the loosening during good times can be contributed to overly-
optimistic growth assumptions. These assumptions are part of the game that many 
governments play. According to L. Jonung and M. Larch (2004), government parties in power 
are prone to describe the economic future in an optimistic manner.51 Furthermore, due to the 
emphasis on numerical values, and particularly the 3 percent deficit limit, incentives are 
created to circumvent the rules without taking the sustainable adjustments. V. Koen and P. 
van den Noord (2005) write that during Maastricht and the SGP, several countries engaged in 
so-called ‘one-offs’ and ‘creative accounting and fiscal gimmicks’. Von Hagen and Wolff 
(2006) furthermore provide empirical evidence that indicate ‘’ that the introduction of the 
stability and growth pact and the excessive deficit procedure in Europe have resulted in 
creative accounting.’’ 52  
Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. This observation reflects trade-offs 
that are typical for supra-national arrangements.53 But is this a consequence of the SGP 
design? Initially, the design of the Pact has been criticized frequently by a large group of 
                                                             
49 J. Gali and R. Perotti, ‘’ Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe’’, Economic Policy Vol. 18:37 
(2003), 563. 
50 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’12-13. 
51 L. Jonung and M. Larch, ‘’Improving fiscal policy in the EU: The case for independent forecasts’’, European 
Economy Economic Papers No. 210 (2004), 11. 
52 J. von Hagen and G.B. Wolff, ‘’ What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative 
accounting with fiscal rules in the EU’’, GESY Discussion Paper No. 148 (2006), 21. 
53 M. Buti, S. Eiffinger and D. Franco, ‘’ Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal 
adjustment?’’, 1. 
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scholars, and for various reasons, but how can this argument explain the mixed results while 
member states experienced the same external constraints?  
2.5: Exploring the results after the implementation of the SGP.  
A number of arguments have been raised by the literature in order to explain the emerging 
divisions among the euro-area. The first division appeared in the early years of the SGP, 
where a wide gap emerged between small and large member states. As a group, with the 
notable exceptions of Portugal and Greece, small countries have managed to achieve and 
maintain an underlying balance of their fiscal positions, while this was not applicable for the 
large countries.54 A second division developed after the outbreak of the financial crisis, with 
an underperformance of Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, Greece and Spain, the so-called 
PI(I)GS.    
2.5.1: Structural patterns. Large vs. Small.  
Although the overall balance of the Eurozone as a whole started to improve during the first 
SGP period (1999-2004), scholars started to identify the first structural pattern. Figure one 
shows the divergent trends between a weighted average of Germany, France and Italy on the 
one hand, and a weighted average of the other euro-area countries on the other. A. Annet 
(2006) writes: ‘’ one clear pattern, noted by many, is that a gulf opened up under the SGP 
between large and small countries (Annett and Jaeger, 2004; De Haan et.al, 2004; Buti and 
Pench, 2004; OECD, 2005; von Hagen, 2005).’’55   
One argument stresses that the costs of fiscal consolidation tend to be larger in large 
countries which in return can explain their difficulties to reduce the deficit close-to-balance.56 
From here, the lack of consolidation mirrors the so called ‘Maastricht-fatigue’. The call for 
budgetary retrenchment and structural reforms, as imposed by Maastricht, would not suit 
large countries while it may work in small countries. This comes forward from the 
observation that ‘’ Compared to large, relatively closed economies, smaller, more open 
economies have a stronger incentive to undertake supply-side reforms rather than pursuing 
an expansionary fiscal policy, since reforms not only boost potential output directly, but also 
                                                             
54 M. Buti and L.R. Pench, ‘’ Why Do Large Countries Flout the Stability Pact? And What Can Be Done About 
It?’’, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 42:5 (2004), 1026. 
55 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, 9. 
56 M. Buti and L.R. Pench, ‘’ Why Do Large Countries Flout the Stability Pact? And What Can Be Done About 
It?’’, 1027. 
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reduce inflationary pressure which allows them to gain competitiveness and increase external 
demand.’’57 
Figure one: Structural balance in large versus small countries in the Euro area, 1999-
2004 (in percent of potential GDP)58 
 
Source: A. Annett, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change 
under Europe’s fiscal framework’’, IMF Working Paper 06/116 (2006), 11. 
 A second argument emphasizes that effective consolidation needs strong growth. M. 
Buti and R. Pench (2004) write ‘’ strong growth helps to reduce the budget deficit directly via 
the working of automatic stabilizers, but also eases structural consolidation to the extent that 
carrying out restrictive fiscal policies may be easier when the overall cake is growing and it 
is therefore easier to compensate the losers. Since large countries have grown considerably 
more slowly than smaller countries, their retrenchment efforts have been hampered (von 
Hagen, 2002; Fatás et al., 2003).’’59 Accordingly, A. Annett (2006) writes ‘’ Countries 
experiencing high growth volatility tended to adopt more disciplined fiscal policy under the 
SGP (…). Growth volatility was also associated with lower forecast errors.’’60 
 Another set of arguments reflect the political nature of the SGP. Several scholars have 
explored the political impact of the SGP on fiscal behaviour of Member States. According to 
Chang (2006), the SGP pitted large states against small states, referring to the compliance 
crisis of 2003.61 Since the ECOFIN Council comprises of all the EMU Member States, 
                                                             
57 Ibidem, 1027-1028. 
58 The large countries are Germany, France and Italy. 
59 Ibidem, 1028. 
60 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, 23. 
61 M. Chang, ‘’ Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Size and Influence in EMU Policymaking’’, Journal of 
European Integration Vol. 28:1 (2006), 107. 
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ultimate decisions are made by a qualified majority voting.62 This mechanism was used by the 
Council to extent the EDP for France and Germany, while in return, smaller countries (like 
the Netherlands) did receive formal notices. Chang argues that in a system where a monetary 
sanction is only used with extreme reluctance, the most powerful sanction therefore is public 
embarrassment, ‘naming and shaming’. The usefulness of this procedure will vary according 
to country size. This can be explained according to the ‘relative power argument’ which 
stipulates that smaller countries tend to stick to the rules where large countries tend to ignore 
treaty rules. Large countries would suffer less from the sanctions, have lower reputational 
costs, and possess more influence than the smaller candidates.63 M. Hallerberg (2011) sought 
verification for this argument using an empirical model. He concluded that countries having a 
contracts-based form of fiscal governance64, which are usually small countries, are much less 
likely to receive a recommendation and, and once they get one, they comply.65  
 In summary, A. Annett (2006) writes, ‘’ Small countries are simply more accustomed 
to external influences over policy (Von Hagen, 1998; Von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and 
Strauch, 2000). Also, as they tend to have less bargaining power, the loss of reputation from 
violating the fiscal rule is greater (De Haan, Berger, and Jansen, 2003). Small countries 
could also fear tangible pecuniary losses such as reductions in structural funds. Large 
countries may view the cost of profligate fiscal policy to be low, given that they suffer little 
diminution in reputation. Others note that while the Maastricht criteria were fully supported 
by the large countries, the political ownership of the fiscal rules subsequently shifted to the 
smaller countries which valued sound fiscal positions but had little influence with their peers 
(OECD, 2005).’’66 
 
 
 
                                                             
62 Due to the economic crisis, six proposals for regulations and directives were adopted in November 2011, this 
‘SixPack’ entailed a new form of voting in the European Council and a reversed qualified majority voting is now 
used. Source: K. Seng and J. Biesenbender, ‘’ Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact in Times of Crisis’’, 
Journal of Contemporary European Research Vol. 8:4 (2012), 452. 
63 M. Chang, ‘’ Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Size and Influence in EMU Policymaking’’, 117-118. 
64 See chapter 3 
65 M. Hallerberg, ‘’ Member State Sanctioning and Compliance under the European Union’s Stability and 
Growth Pact’’, Paper presented at the 2011 EUSA Meetings (Boston, 2011), 27. 
66 A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How fiscal policy did and did not change under 
Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, 15. 
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2.5.2: Structural patterns. The PI(I)GS.  
The sovereign debt crisis proved to be the biggest test yet for the EMU. On October 16th, 
2009, the newly elected Prime Minister G. Papandreou announced that the Greek debt and 
deficit figures regularly communicated to the European authorities, were deeply wrong. This 
statement proved to be a trigger: from that moment on, a succession of violent shocks spread 
out over the European continent.67 Greece is currently seen as the most troubled country in the 
EMU. Characterized by a weak institutional budgetary framework in combination with an 
inefficient economy and government administration, Greece currently has to face hard 
austerity reforms posed by its bail-out creditors. The compliance results further suggest that 
Greece is one of the worst performers of under the SGP. This country will therefore be further 
analysed in a case-study in chapter five.  
 Ireland was hit first after the Greek announcement. Before the crisis, this Celtic Tiger 
had delivered a period of extraordinary growth: from 1987 to 2007, economic growth 
averaged 6.3 percent per year combined with steady improvements in productivity and 
employment. Although the supply-side policies turned out to be effective, the Irish 
government still lacked macroeconomic stabilization policies. Characterized by a housing 
market collapse, soaring unemployment and a full-scale banking crisis, this turnaround in 
Ireland’s economic fortune was perhaps the most dramatic of any country in the euro area.68  
Next up was Portugal, where the absence of growth fuelled doubts about the country’s 
ability to repay its debts. In contrary to Ireland, Portugal had endured consecutive years of 
high deficits and an increasing level of government debt (see table 5 and 6). The prognosis for 
the Portuguese economy was pessimistic even before the financial crisis began. In 2006 the 
chief economist described Portugal as a country in serious trouble, with a deteriorated growth 
of productivity, very low economic growth, a large budget deficit and the likely prospect of 
competitive disinflation.69 In May 2010, Greece became the first to receive financial 
assistance in exchange for implementing an economic programme designed by the Troika of 
                                                             
67 J. Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis and its aftermath (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), 8. 
68 K. Whelan, ‘’ Ireland’s economic crisis: The good, the bad and the ugly’’, UCD centre of economic research 
working paper series WP 13/06 (2013), 1. 
69 P. Pedroso, Portugal and the global crisis: the impact of austerity on the economy, the social model and the 
performance of the state (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014), 2. 
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the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. Within a year, Ireland 
and Portugal followed the same path.70  
 In contrary to Portugal and Greece, Spain’s growth prospects also looked promising as 
investments poured into the real estate sector. For example, in the year preceding the crisis, 
there were more housing starts in Spain (population 45 million) than in Germany, France and 
Italy combined (population 204 million). When this housing bubble popped, Spain was 
pushed into a crisis with over 25 percent unemployment, a depressed tax base, and increased 
government entitlement spending. 71  Spain’s inability to cope with the housing crisis can be 
linked to the structure of the Spanish economy. Although  Spain preformed much better with 
regard to the budget balance then the other PIIGS, the Spanish economy had an inflexible 
labour market, an insufficient and unregulated banking system, bad allocation of resources 
and a private debt to GDP of nearly 220 percent.72  
 Italy in an interesting case, as this country is both identified during the SGP as a ‘large 
country’ as well as one of the PIIGS.  The Italian economy is the third largest economy in the 
euro zone, but it is plagued by inefficiency and the economy continues to shrink.73 The major 
problem of Italy’s economy is its widening competitiveness gap. Italy’s traditionally high 
levels of public ownership, regulatory barriers to competition and administrative burden to 
start-ups makes it difficult to enter the world market (see chapter four). Italy’s government 
debt surpassed 120 per cent in 2011 and since 2009, Italy has run a deficit well above the 3 
percent limit. These deficits mirror the lack of economic growth rather than a deterioration of 
the country’s own internal financial situation. The roots of this economic backwardness have 
been widely investigated and can be contributed to several factors: high inflation which in 
return led to a rise of nominal wages, thus weakening competitiveness, the internal regional 
division between North and South, a rigid labour market and lastly corruption which hindered 
the effectiveness of investments.74  
                                                             
70 J. Pisani-Ferry, A. Sapir and G.B. Wolff, EU-IMF assistance to euro-area countries: an early assessment 
(Brussels: Bruegel Bleuprint Series, 2013), 1. 
71 ‘’ The Spanish Financial Crisis: Economic reforms and the export-led recovery’’, 
studentpulse.com/articles/921/the-spanish-financial-crisis-economic-reforms-and-the-export-led-recovery, 
consulted at 18-03-2015. 
72 Ibidem. 
73 ‘’ Basta 'La Casta': No End in Sight to Italy's Economic Decline’’, spiegel.de/international/europe/economic-
crisis-in-italy-continues-to-worsen-a-912716.html, consulted at 19-03-2015. 
74 E. Cencig, ‘’ Italy’s economy in the euro zone crisis and Monti’s reform agenda’’, Research Division EU 
Integration Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Working 
Paper No.5 (2012), 19. 
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Consequently, it has been argued that the PIIGS do not form a homogenous group. 
Ireland and Spain in particular stands out. While the Irish growth model depended heavily on 
a low-tax, market conforming approach to encourage foreign direct investment, the southern 
European countries depended on a growth model that traditionally can be characterized by a 
strong state presence, shaping investments and generating demand stimulus.75 Also, where 
Ireland faced particular problems with their banking system, Portugal and Greece had to coop 
with government mismanagement problems in their public finances and the economy in 
general. The latter is also applicable for Spain although they have performed rather well with 
regard to the budget balance. 76 
Despite these differences, the PIIGS all saw their debt spiralling out of control. 
Therefore, general insights in the literature tend to focus on the accumulation of government 
debt. As the introduction of the Euro led to soft budget constraints in the PIIGS countries, the 
fiscal rules of the SGP and Maastricht could not prevent the fiscally weak countries from 
returning to unsustainable fiscal policies.77 According to A.L Costa Fernandes and P.R Mota 
(2011), the underlying reason for the underperformance of the PIIGS can be summarized due 
to the fact that: ‘’ in spite of their weaker economies, plagued by structural imbalances 
making them increasingly uncompetitive and, as a consequence, enjoying comparatively 
lower and more volatile growth rates of their real GDPs, PIGS chose to replicate the fiscal 
policies of their more prosperous member partners rather than adjusting in real terms. Faced 
with the negative external shocks arising from the financial crisis starting in 2007 and from 
its economic shockwaves, suddenly these countries were forced to confront themselves with 
the burst of their public debt burden.’’78 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
75 S. Brazys and N. Hardiman, ‘’ From tiger to PIIGS:  Ireland and the use of heuristics in comparative political 
economy’’, Geary institute discussion paper series No. 16 (2013), 10. 
76 A.L. Costa Fernandes and P.R. Mota, ‘’ The Roots of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis: PIGS vs Non-
PIGS’’, PANOECONOMICUS Special Issue No.5 (2011), 640. 
77 T. Baskaran and Z. Hessami, ‘’ A Tale of Five PIIGS: Soft Budget Constraints and the EMU Sovereign Debt 
Crises’’, University of Konstanz Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 45 (2011), 17. 
78 A.L. Costa Fernandes and P.R. Mota, ‘’ The Roots of the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis: PIGS vs Non-
PIGS’’, 642. 
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2.6: Conclusion. 
The Stability and Growth pact was implemented to prevent and correct excessive deficits of 
the EMU countries, and is designed to ensure that the fiscal policies of the Member States 
support the smooth functioning of the EMU. However, since its implementation in 1997, it 
has frequently been criticized. While much of the criticism is aimed at the Pact itself, it is 
rather surprising that although the Member States were bound to the same external 
constraints, their results were mixed. Moreover, while the SGP sets budgetary constraints on a 
supranational level, many EMU candidates implemented the requirements on the surface, 
while returning to the legacy of past fiscal profligacy. After the introduction of the Euro, 
fiscal policies were broadly relaxed, and the first years of the SGP can therefore be described 
as ‘’wasted good times’’. There was little progress towards sound public finances, while the 
credibility of the fiscal rules were compromised.  
 After the implementation of the Euro, scholars started to notice a first structural 
pattern of poor performers. The large countries Italy, France and Germany continued to fail 
the budgetary targets set by the SGP whereas the small countries preformed relatively well. 
From here there is an abundant source of literature that explains why large Member States 
have more difficulties adhering to the Pact. In summary, large countries have higher 
consolidation costs, experience slower economic growth, are less susceptible to peer pressure 
and have more bargaining power. While the political ownership shifted to the smaller 
countries over time, they still had little influence with their peers. Moreover, small countries 
are more accustomed to peer pressure and political influence. They tend to suffer more from 
reputational costs and imposed fines when they do not comply. Also, high growth volatility 
and lower consolidation costs usually results in a stronger fiscal discipline. Over time, smaller 
countries performed better under the SGP than the large ones. 
 When the financial crisis erupted in 2007, the attention turned to another group of 
countries, all experiencing an explosion of increasing government debt, the PI(I)GS. Although 
the underlying roots of their problems differ, these countries choose to replicate the fiscal 
policies of their more prosperous member partners rather than adjusting in real terms. 
Furthermore, especially the southern countries of this group are currently facing structural 
problems with their economy resulting in a loss of competitiveness, macroeconomic 
imbalances and a high unemployment.   
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This does not mean that these latter problems where non-existent in the other Member 
States. Several countries relied on overly optimistic growth assumptions, engaged in creative 
accounting and circumvented the rules of the Pact without taking the sustainable adjustments. 
In reaction to these observations, new rules with regard to public finances where introduced. 
After the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2009, the European Council concluded that in 
order to support long-term sustainability, national frameworks need to be strengthened.79 
Looking back, many scholars now argue that ‘’ the observed failures in attaining sound and 
sustainable fiscal positions in a large number of EU countries in the pre-crisis period can 
largely be attributed to the significant weaknesses in the national fiscal governance structures 
across EU Member States’’80  In order to confirm this notion, chapter three will reflect the 
instruments that make up a resilient fiscal framework. In what way can we link the 
compliance results and structural patterns with the strength of domestic fiscal frameworks? 
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Chapter three: Looking into the determinants of fiscal success. 
The financial crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses in the EU’s economic framework.81 
In order to achieve fiscal discipline, governments have to maintain fiscal positions that are 
consistent with macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth. The results of poor 
fiscal discipline translates in procyclical discretionary spending increases and tax cuts in good 
times, while in bad times pressing deficits and debt sustainability problems make 
countercyclical fiscal policy impossible.82 The fiscal legacy of the financial crisis has raised 
concerns about the capacity of governments to maintain sustainable public finances. In order 
to raise credibility, commitments to sound public finances need to be strengthened.83   
Fiscal governance has a twofold perspective. First, there is the EU-wide dimension. The 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact establish a European fiscal framework 
with the objective to enforce fiscal sustainability and stabilise public finances in the EU 
member states.84 With the 2011 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, several policies have 
been implemented to ensure sound fiscal governance throughout the EMU.85  The Directive 
on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (2011) lays down rules to 
specific elements, in particular: 
1) Systems of budgetary accounting and statistical reporting. 
2) Rules and procedures governing the preparation of forecasts for budgetary planning. 
3) County-specific numerical fiscal rules. 
4) Medium-term budgetary frameworks. 86 
 
The second perspective refers to the domestic institutional context. While the EU member 
states all face the same constraints from the European policy framework, the application of 
fiscal rules and multi-annual targets varies considerably at the national level.87 It is especially 
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this perspective that has gained more attention from analysts and policy-makers. As Ayuso-i- 
Casals et al. (2007) write, ‘’ (…) the observed failures in attaining sound and sustainable 
fiscal positions in a large number of EU countries in the pre-crisis period can largely be 
attributed to the significant weaknesses in the national fiscal governance structures across 
EU Member States.’’88   
This chapter will provide an overview about the determinants of sustainable public 
finances with an emphasis on the domestic fiscal framework. Starting by exploring the 
sources of the deficit bias, this chapter will cover the available instruments to restrain decision 
makers and maintain long-term sustainability. The ultimate aim is to give a basic overview 
about the literature on fiscal governance and to establish a set of indicators for chapter four in 
order to link the compliance results of chapter two with the strength of the elements that 
define a resilient domestic fiscal framework.  
3.1: The influence of the democratic political process on the deficit and debt bias. 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970’s, it 
has been obvious that there is a bias in favour of increasing public debt levels.89 The 
economic literature has identified a number of reasons why the deficit and debt bias are likely 
to emanate from the democratic political process.90  
First, there is the logic of the standard common pool model. This notion recognizes the 
fact that politicians represent different groups and have vested interests. They therefore have 
no incentive to constrain their spending demands because the overall costs are shared by the 
whole population. Policy makers engage in excessive spending because their constituencies 
and the people who they represent, do not have to bear the full costs of the public policy 
programs they bid for. M. Hallerberg et.al. (2004) writes: ‘’ Putting the argument into a 
dynamic context, one can show that the externality problem results in excessive deficits and 
debts (Velasco, 1999).’’91 
Secondly, politicians want to be re-elected (myopic). Therefore, politicians will focus on 
short-term electoral gain and neglect the longer term effects of running up debt. This also 
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creates a deficit bias. Other origins of the common pool problem are (1) fiscal illusion, where 
voters do not fully understand the intertemporal budget constraint because ‘information costs’ 
are too high, (2) problems of representation and distribution, impeded by ‘wars of attrition’ 
across interest groups and (3) the problem of ‘time inconsistency’ where ex ante the 
government may announce fiscal adjustments, but ex post due economic- or political reasons 
do not renege on its promise and undertake additional spending. 92  
Another source feeding the deficit bias can be contributed to the implementation of pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. This is especially the case when fiscal policy is asymmetric over the 
business cycle, being countercyclical during bad times, but procyclical during good times.93 
The fiscal rules of the SGP were designed to promote fiscal discipline without impairing 
fiscal flexibility. This is however less hard to achieve when structural budget deficits can be 
kept at lower levels.94 Although it is been debated whether or not discretionary fiscal policy in 
the euro area has become more countercyclical after the implementation of the Euro (J. Gali 
and R. Perotti, 2003; A. Annett and A. Jeager, 2004; F. Huart, 2013), table 7 shows that pro-
cyclical policies are still common in the EMU. Table 7 indicates that during the economic 
boom in 1999-2000, only Finland undertook substantial adjustments. The other countries 
loosened fiscal policies or stood still.95 
Procyclical fiscal policies are generally regarded as potentially damaging for welfare. 
According to the literature ‘’ they raise macroeconomic volatility, depress investment in real 
and human capital, hamper growth, and harm the poor (Serven, 1998; World Bank, 2000; 
IMF, 2005; IMF 2005b).’’96 So what causes procyclical fiscal policies? A common answer 
has to do with the supply of credit. In bad times, borrowing becomes more difficult and they 
cannot run deficits or have to cut spending. In good times, borrowing becomes easier and 
governments can therefore increase public spending. This answer however raises a critical 
questions: Why don’t these countries self-insure themselves by building up reserves in good 
times? The current literature therefore suggests a number of explanations: Weak institutions, 
corruption, asymmetric information, common pool problems, a lack of fiscal rules and 
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borrowing constraints and a lack of law-enforcement mechanisms all contribute to the 
tendency of governments to use pro-cyclical policies (P. Manasse, 2006; F. Huart, 2012).97  
Table 7: Fiscal adjustment during SGP in the early years, 1999-2004 (change in 
cyclically adjusted primary balance). 
Member State  Good Times Bad times Overall 
    1999-2000 2001-2004 1999-2004 
Austria   -0.2 1.7 1.5 
Belgium   -1.4 -0.6 -2 
Finland   3.2 -4.9 -1.7 
France   0 -1.5 -1.5 
Germany   -0.6 -0.9 -1.4 
Greece   -2.9 -4.6 -7.6 
Ireland   -0.7 -2 -2.8 
Italy   -1.4 -2.1 -3.4 
Netherlands 0.2 -0.1 0.2 
Portugal   -0.6 2.4 2.8 
Spain   0 0.5 0.5 
Denmark   0.2 0.7 0.9 
Sweden   0.5 -3.1 -2.6 
UK   0.3 -5.2 -4.8 
Average EU-14 -0.2 -1.4 -1.7 
Source: A. Annet, ‘’ Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not 
Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework’’, IMF Working Paper 06/116 (2006), 13. 
Fiscal behaviour can also be effected by the political cycle of a country. According to 
M. Buti and P. van den Noord (2003), the electoral budget cycle ‘’is alive and well in the 
EMU.’’98 They empirically tested the role of elections on the fiscal stance of the Member 
States for the period from 1999-2003. The results suggests that there is a clear tendency 
towards tax-cuts in (pre-) election years. Non-election years show a small bias towards tax 
increases. It is therefore likely that electorally motivated fiscal policy under the SGP may 
have contributed to an expansionary bias in numerous candidates. As elections come closer, 
governments tend to implement tax cuts and increase spending.99 
The last argument suggests that deficits bias increases accordingly with the number of 
representatives that can make autonomous spending decisions. Therefore, the more 
fragmented the budget process is, the bigger the tendency to spend more and to run larger 
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deficits.100 This theory is strongly rooted in the political economy literature where political 
institutionalists are concerned on how certain institutions in the political system affect fiscal 
policy.101 J. Hagen et.al. (2001) writes ‘’ Since the most important representatives of 
individual spending interests in European governments are the individual spending ministers, 
an implication of this proposition is that government spending and deficits grow with the 
number of spending departments and ministers in a country’s government. Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (1999) confirm this proposition empirically for OECD countries.’’ 102 
In summary, the political economy theorists provide a various number of factors that can 
all contribute to a feed of the deficit bias. A. Annet (2006) writes: ‘’ Among advanced 
economies, the literature shows that a plethora of interrelated factors— large and disparate 
coalitions, a high number of spending ministers, proportional electoral systems, electoral 
uncertainty, and short government duration—can all act to feed the deficit bias and generate 
suboptimal fiscal policy (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991; 
Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Kontopoulis and Perotti, 1999; Annett, 2002; de Haan, Sturm and 
Beekhuis, 1999).’’ 103  Furthermore, it is also important to recognise that deficit biases may be 
even greater in a monetary union for several reasons: 
(1)  ‘’The exchange rate risk and the associated interest rate risk premium is no longer 
operable, lessening the disciplining effect of fiscal policy.’’ 
(2) ‘’The costs of profligate fiscal policy can be shared with other Member States, which 
can exacerbate the deficit bias.’’104 
(3) ‘’Members may expect others to rescue them if they get into trouble.’’105 
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3.2: What makes a strong domestic fiscal framework? Analysing the budgetary 
procedure. 
In order to tackle the deficit and debt bias, the literature provides several instruments who 
have the potential to improve the incentive for policy makers to use direction responsibly, 
reduce deficit biases and improve fiscal outcomes. This is why fiscal governance is important. 
The objective of fiscal governance is (1) attaining sound budgetary positions in particular by 
containing the deficit bias, i.e. tackling the tendency to conduct unsustainable fiscal policies 
giving rise to high deficits and increasing debt ratios, (2) reducing the cyclicality of fiscal 
policy making and (3) improving the efficiency of public spending. 106   
Instruments can be established who complement separate stages of the budget process. 
There are three principal stages of the budgetary process: planning, decision making and 
implementation. The budgetary procedure also has to be monitored and correctional 
mechanisms need to be implemented.107 National fiscal governance or domestic fiscal 
frameworks can therefore be defined at those rules, regulations and procedures that influence 
on how budgetary policy is planned, approved, implemented and monitored.108 
The design of resilient domestic fiscal frameworks are generally characterized by four 
main components:109 
(1) Independent fiscal institutions. 
(2) Budgetary procedures governing the preparation approval and implementation of 
budget plans.  
(3) Following point two, medium-term budgetary frameworks for multi-annual budgetary 
planning need to be taken in consideration for the budget plans.  
(4) Numerical fiscal rules.  
 
Consequently, the next part of this chapter look on how these instruments work on a national 
level. Which instruments are regarded as most successful and how do they have to be 
implemented in order to be effective?   
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3.2.1: The use of independent forecasters.  
One of the reform options for the member states to consider is to constrain the decision-
makers by putting greater reliance on independent agencies. Independent institutions have an 
important role for the first stage of the budgeting process: the budget planning. According to 
L. Jonung and M. Larch (2004) economic forecast errors account for deterioration in fiscal 
position over a relatively long period of time. Governments have a tendency to be overly 
optimistic on economic growth in the process of budget planning in order to play down the 
need for fiscal consolidation. Not only figures of growth, but also inflation rates and other 
variables are prone to optimistic biases. These optimistic biases are documented in various 
empirical studies of official forecasts.110  
Two options are provided as a solution to this optimism bias. The first option is to 
improve the methods of forecasting within the existing institutional framework. This option 
used to be suggested by economist, but they tended to neglect the political incentive structure. 
Therefore, today, economists stress a better reform solution where the existing institutions are 
replaced with independent institutions in order to diminish the political incentive structure. In 
order to implement an effective independent institution, member states should consider the 
following:  
- Independent institutions should be independent from the ministry of finance and the 
government, where the only task of this institution should be producing forecast 
growth and other variables that are crucial for the budgetary process.  
- These institutes should be run by experts, protected by legislation from domestic 
political pressure.  
            - It should be open, transparent and accountable for its forecasts.111  
During the SGP period, several economic figures of member states had to be revised 
as a consequence of ‘creative accounting’. Independent forecasters can be a first line of 
defence against these practises. Secondly, member states can use independent bodies to 
evaluate their fiscal policies, marking up reputational costs, while possessing no formal fiscal 
policy powers. Belgium uses a High Council of Finance who recommends and provides 
policy assessments. Also Denmark’s Economic Council evaluates both fiscal and structural 
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policies. These institutional arrangements helped to contribute a turnaround in fiscal policy in 
these countries (Hallerberg, 2004; IMF, 2005).112 
This positive effect is also recognized by the European Commission. They state that the 
established independent public bodies of the member state have been contributing positively 
to fiscal policy making trough one or several of the following three channels: 
1) The provision of independent analysis on fiscal policy issues. This may also include 
the monitoring of budgetary developments, assessing compliance with the existing 
fiscal rules and/or the estimation of budgetary costs of specific policy measures.  
2) The provision of unbiased inputs for the annual budget preparation. Most importantly, 
macroeconomic forecasts on which budgetary projections are based.  
3) The issuing of regular assessments and recommendations relating to different aspects 
of fiscal policy.113 
 
I will therefore use these three channels for further analysing purposes in the next chapter. 
Lastly, the economic crisis has led to the introduction of fast decision-making mechanisms to 
trigger measures for crisis prevention. Examples of such mechanisms are escape clauses 
allowing for temporary suspension of fiscal rules.114 It should be stressed however that 
although these mechanisms may prove to be helpful in times of deteriorated economic 
conditions, credibility of the independent fiscal institutions must be insured at all times.  
3.2.2: Resolving the co-ordination problem in domestic budgetary procedures: An 
institutional approach. 
While correct forecasts can be provided by independent institutions, excessive spending and 
deficits may arise due to a co-ordination problem in the budgetary procedure. When the 
number of individual spending ministers rises, the budgetary procedure becomes more 
fragmented. The political economy therefore emphasizes the importance of decision-making 
rules that promote a comprehensive view of the externality problem, i.e., the common pool 
problem.  The solution to fragmentation is thus centralization of the budgeting process, where 
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participants recognize the true cost and benefit of the projects financed from the general tax 
fund.115 
  This solution is part of a growing body of empirical and theoretical literature that 
suggests that the institutions governing the budget process are important determinants of a 
country’s fiscal performance (von Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994b; von Hagen, 
1999; von Hagen and Strauch, 2000; Hallerberg, 2004). 116 There are two basic institutional 
approaches to achieve the necessary coordination overcoming the common pool problem: the 
delegation approach and the contract approach. Consequently, these two institutional 
approaches are suited for different types of governments.  
  The delegation approach emphasizes a minister of finance as a strong agenda-setter in 
the initial budget planning stage. Discretion is key in this approach. This minister takes on the 
role as a decision-maker with significant strategic powers who is less bound to special 
interests. Consequently, these powers can be used to correct deviations from the budget 
planning.117 The effectiveness of this form of governance depends on the party structure of the 
government. The delegation approach is most effective in one-party governments for two 
reasons: First, in a coalition party, a conflict of interest may occur among the cabinet 
members since there is just one central player that monitors and punishes spending ministers. 
Coalition ministers simply don’t trust a strong financial minister as they fear unequal 
treatment. Second, the punishing mechanism depends on the power of the prime minster, and 
by extension the finance minister, to replace overspending ministers. In one-party systems this 
has fewer consequences for the stability of the government whereas in a coalition 
government, this move might implicate a collapse.118   
With the contract approach, coalition parties set the key budget parameters. Here, the 
process of negotiation must lead to the realisation of the externality to all the participants. 
This suggests that the planning stage is important to commitment states. Different parties 
negotiate a ‘fiscal contract’ involving strict budget targets, usually during the coalition 
negotiations. Therefore, commitment lends itself more to formal rules. Compliance with these 
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targets are monitored by the opposition in parliament. The minister of finance just has a 
monitoring and enforcing role, without any discretionary power.119  
 Next to these ideal systems, there is both a mixed form of governance and fiefdom. 
Under fiefdom, decision making is decentralized, where governments suffer from the 
common pool problem. Fiefdom is characterized by individual spending minsters who all 
suffer from additional spending by other ministers that comes from the same tax revenue pot. 
Fiefdom can only be identified by looking at one or more stages in the budgeting process. For 
example, concerning the decision-making stage, one should look for situations in which the 
minister does exactly what the party wants, without interference from other coalition parties 
or a strong minister of finance.120 A mixed form of governance is usually suited for minority 
governments, where there are not enough votes in the parliament to pass legislation. Good 
examples are Sweden and Denmark. Here, the most effective method is to include selected 
opposition parties in budget negotiations early in the process.121 
Now that the different systems are discussed, a classification can be made for the EU-
15 member states. Table 8 categorizes the EU-15 for the time period 1973-2000.  From here, 
several observations can be made. First, the overall budgetary process is more centralized now 
than in the early 1990’s. Countries like Greece, Belgium, Italy and Spain all moved from 
fiefdom to a more centralized form of fiscal governance. A remarkable outsider is Austria, 
who has both seen a contract- as well as a delegation form of fiscal governance. Second, 
institutional reforms are now in line with the structure of government to the type of fiscal 
governance. The overall current pattern confirms that countries with predominantly coalition 
governments employ the contract approach while electoral systems leading to majority 
governments and persistent party constellations in government tend to follow a delegation 
approach.122 
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Table 8: Categorization of States: forms of fiscal governance, 1973-2000.  
Country Form of fiscal governance 
Austria Fiefdom 1980-84, Commitment 1985-91, Fiefdom 1993-95,  
  Commitment 1996-97, Fiefdom 1998-99, Delegation 2000 
Belgium Fiefdom 1980-92, Commitment 1993-2000 
Denmark Fiefdom 1980-81, Mixed 1982-2000  
Finland Commitment; Strengthened mid-1990’s 
France Delegation 
Germany Delegation 
Greece Fiefdom 1980-96, Delegation 1997-2000 
Ireland Fiefdom 1980-87, Mixed 1988-91, Commitment 1992-2000 
Italy Fiefdom 1980-95, Delegation 1996-2000 
Luxembourg Commitment 
Netherlands Fiefdom 1980-82, Commitment 1983-00, strengthened 1994 
Portugal Fiefdom 1980-00 
Spain Fiefdom 1980-93, Mixed 1994-2000, Delegation 2000 
Sweden Fiefdom 1980-96, Mixed 1997-2000 
United Kingdom Delegation 
 
Source: M. Hallerberg, Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal governance from the end of Bretton Woods 
to EMU (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38. 
Unfortunately, besides the work of Von Hagen and co-authors, there is little research 
on the choice of governance.123 I will therefore not include further comparative research in the 
next chapter. Still, in an EU-wide dimension, an important observation is made by A. Annett 
(2006). He writes ‘’with its emphasis on multi-annual targets and a regular review 
procedure, the SGP fits snugly with the numerical contracts approach associated with 
commitment states, but not so well with countries relying on domestic governance institutions 
(von Hagen, Hughes Hallett, and Strauch, 2000).’’124 
So how can we link these observations with the structural patterns described in chapter 
two? According to A. Annett (2006), the fiscal governance hypothesis outlined above, can be 
used to explain the behaviour of all the relatively weak performers under the SGP. France, 
Germany, Italy and Greece are all delegation countries.125  However, according to M. Buti 
and R. Pench (2004), not all of the delegation or quasi-delegation countries had problems in 
respecting the rules of the SGP. As a consequence of reforms, Spain and Austria both shifted 
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to the delegation camp as from 2000. Moreover, this was not associated with a lower 
commitment to a tight implementation of the SGP.126  
3.2.3: How Member States can overcome the deficit and debt bias: The use of numerical 
fiscal rules.  
Although a proper institutional setting may contribute to a more comprehensive view to the 
budget, decision makers must extend the horizon of fiscal planning beyond the annual 
budgetary calendar.127 Fiscal rules can provide a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, but 
these rules must go beyond the traditional indicators of fiscal performance (government 
deficits and government debt). The influence of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes must provide a 
good mix between budgetary discipline and macroeconomic stabilization.128 Moreover, in an 
empirical research, X. Debrun et.al. (2008) conclude that there is a robust link between the 
use of numerical fiscal rules and fiscal performance: ‘’ stronger and more encompassing 
fiscal rules tend to encourage higher cyclically adjusted primary balances, after taking into 
account other factors potentially affecting fiscal behaviour.’’129 
Fiscal rules can take different forms and can consist of ‘hard’ (legally binding) and 
‘soft’ (peer pressure) constraints. These rules supplement the monitoring of fiscal policy by 
voters and financial markets. They also provide a benchmark through which the actual course 
of fiscal policy can be assed. This should have a positive influence on the government’s 
incentive structure. The quality of these rules are assed trough a number of criteria of which 
most cited are those of Kopits and Symansky (1998). 130 According to Kopits and Symansky, 
optimal fiscal rules should be: Well-defined, transparent, adequate, simple, flexible, 
consistent, enforceable and efficient.131   
 Numerical fiscal rules are one of the main elements in the domestic fiscal framework. 
They come in four different forms; budgetary balance rules, debt rules, expenditure- and 
revenue rules. They set binding objectives in terms of a budgetary aggregate such as a budget 
balance target or an expenditure ceiling. The numerical rules play an important role in 
improving the conduct of budgetary policy and attaining sound fiscal outcomes. The 
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importance of these rules have so far been underscored in both the literature as in a number of 
country-specific policy experiences. These fiscal arrangements are effectively used as an 
instrument to tackle procyclical tendencies and the deficit bias coming forward out of the 
political economy. The contribution of fiscal rules to macroeconomic stabilization however 
highly depends on the type of rule and its design features. J. Ayuso I Casals (2012) writes: ‘’ 
Simple balanced budget rules can actually increase pro-cyclicality, while other types of rules 
such as expenditure rules or cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules (or a combination of 
both) may be more conducive to an appropriate balance between discipline and 
stabilization.’’132 
 The most widespread fiscal rules across the EU are budget balance rules. According to 
empirical research, they can be linked with better budgetary outcomes (i.e. higher surpluses 
and lower deficits). Still, although they seem to address the deficit bias and enforce budgetary 
discipline, they might entail risks for the quality of public finance.  Fiscal adjustment may rely 
on cuts to politically less sensitive expenditure categories such as R&D. Some countries have 
countered this problem with the introduction of budget balance rules that excludes investment 
expenditure, but these so-called ‘golden rules’ turned out to be difficult to operationalise in 
practice. Another criticism is the potential negative effect on the pro-cyclical bias in the 
conduct of budgetary policy. Again, the positive outcomes of these rules depends on their 
design. For example, one option is to supplement the budgetary rules with flexibility to 
account for cyclical fluctuations. Also, in order to be effective, these rules should be clear and 
confined to strictly specified circumstances in order to preserve credibility.133  
 Other forms of fiscal rules are debt- and revenue rules. Debt rules are also found to 
have a positive effect on fiscal discipline. Their effectiveness depends on the ambition of the 
target and on its design features. Revenue rules are not common across the national fiscal 
frameworks of the EMU countries and a crucial issue in the functioning of these rules is how 
to distinguish transitory from permanent revenue increases. For example, the economic crisis 
of 2009 led to incorrect assessment of the fiscal stance in Spain since overestimated structural 
revenues were calculated towards the booming property and asset prices.134   
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 One of the most promising forms of fiscal rules are expenditure rules. These rules in 
particular have received increasing attention both by literature as well as the European 
Commission.135 According to the European Commission ‘’ (…) expenditure rules represent 
the cornerstones of the most resilient domestic fiscal frameworks in some EU Member States, 
namely those of the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.’’136 The IMF also confirms 
this notion as they write: ‘’ Our findings suggest that expenditure rules are associated with 
spending control, counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and improved fiscal discipline. We find that 
fiscal performance is better in countries where an expenditure rule exists. This appears to be 
related to the properties of expenditure rules as compliance rates are generally higher than 
with other types of rules (on the budget balance or debt, for example).’’137 
Expenditure rules work by targeting the part of the budget that the government 
controls most directly, which should reduce uncertainty about meeting fiscal targets, enhance 
accountability and address the overspending, particularly in good times.138 These rules should 
also be designed to be as credible as possible. According to a study of the ECB of 2010, their 
empirical results suggests that ‘’ deviation from neutral expenditure policies before and 
during the crisis has contributed strongly to public debt dynamics, notably in the macro-
imbalances countries. Public debt ratios in the euro area would not have been much above 
60% and in the macro-imbalances countries near or below 60% at the end of 2009.’’139   
Consequently, the use of numerical fiscal rules in the EU-fiscal framework is 
enhanced through the implementation of expenditure benchmarks at EU level within the new 
rules of the ‘Six Pack’.140 Since 2006, the European Commission have compiled a dataset on 
domestic fiscal rules in force since 1990. These figures are annually updated since 2006 and 
will be used in the comparative research of chapter four.  
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3.2.4: How Member States can overcome the deficit and debt bias: The implementation 
of medium-term budgetary frameworks. 
The implementation of a medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) is required by article 
9(1) of the Budgetary Framework Directive which was adopted as part of the ‘Six Pack’.141 
The European Commission defines MTBFs as ‘’those fiscal arrangements that allow 
government to extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary 
calendar.’’142 Since a single year perspective provides a poor basis for fiscal planning, 
MTBFs can contribute to long term sustainable fiscal planning. Although in general medium 
term budgetary objectives represent a weaker form of commitment than binding rules or 
targets, they may help to ensure budgetary discipline. Therefore, in order to be effective, two 
main elements are relevant: First, the medium term objectives need to supplement the 
expenditure rules for the budget balance based on cautious growth assumptions and realistic 
revenue projections. Independent forecasters can contribute to these demands. Second, The 
MTBFs should rely on binding spending ceilings in order to maintain credibility.143 
  The experience with these types of frameworks is however still limited, as most of 
them have been introduced only quite recently.144 Before 2000, a small group of EU-15 
countries had formal MTBFs in place. Finland adopted a multiannual budgetary framework in 
1994, the Netherlands and Sweden in 1997 and the United Kingdom in 1998.145 In Denmark 
the government also used to set and formulate fiscal policies on MTBFs before 2000, 
although the MTBFs were not part of a formal framework.146  As from 2006, the European 
Commission monitors the existing medium term budgetary frameworks across EU member 
states through a series of annual questionnaires.147  The first key findings were disappointing. 
The European Commission writes in 2009: ‘’ Most of domestic MTBFs exhibited a large 
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number of weaknesses. In particular, scant monitoring and a lack of pre-defined correction 
mechanisms in case of non-compliance emerged as the main shortcomings.’’148  
Since the implementation of the Budgetary Framework Directive of 2011, which 
obliges member states to have such a framework by the end of 2013, many member states 
have introduced new MTBFs or upgraded the existing arrangements. This is currently 
monitored in a medium-term budgetary framework database. Still, it is important to 
emphasize that the Budgetary Framework Directive only sets general requirements. 
Therefore, the MTBFs differ substantially between the member states. Crucial elements that 
contribute to the effectiveness of these frameworks like the coverage (general government and 
sub sectors), the level of political commitment and the monitoring and enforcement of the 
multiannual budgetary targets are still not in place or need to be strengthened in several 
member states.149  
3.2.5: The need for structural reforms: lessons from the economic crisis. 
By 2014, the economic recovery of the EU is still lacking behind with growth of just 1.3% 
compared to 2.4% in the US and 3.3% in the global economy.150 The post-crisis EU- 
environment can be characterized with a large debt overhang, structural unemployment and 
weak productivity levels. The economic crisis highlighted the existence of an important 
interaction in a monetary union between fiscal and structural policies at national level.151 The 
current pace of structural reforms in Europe is however worrisome. According to the reform 
barometer of spring 2015, 22% of the European Commissions recommended national-level 
reforms have been followed up with adequate implementation in comparison with 23% in 
2014.152 
Evidence of the interaction between fiscal outcomes and structural policies can be 
found when looking to Ireland and Spain in the aftermath of the crisis. As those countries both 
experienced relatively similar shocks emanating from the financial and construction sectors, 
they both saw their deficits deteriorate by around 13 percent of GDP between 2007 and 2009.  
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By 2012, Ireland managed to reduce its deficit by more than 7 percent of GDP whereas in 
Spain the primary deficit was just less than 2 per cent lower.  
How can these divergent results be explained? Benoît Cœuré (2014), member of the 
executive board of the ECB, argues that this observation can be contributed to the stronger 
consolidation efforts in Ireland as part of its adjustment programme. Although many other 
factors were also at play, the divergent results of Ireland and Spain showed that economic 
flexibility matters for the size and duration of deficits. When relating this observation to the 
rules of the SGP, Benoît Cœuré argues that there is a correlation between the ease with which 
countries comply with the rules and their progress on structural reforms. 153 Because some 
countries lacked structural reform, they have put themselves in a position of excessive deficit 
dependence. It therefore becomes difficult and costly for them to meet the obligations of the 
SGP. Furthermore, countries like Spain experience weak productivity trends as resources have 
been misallocated in low productive sectors like construction.154 These conditions made 
stabilization policies less effective in boosting demand. 
 Supply-side policies can increase the effectiveness of demand-side policies and help 
empower demand.  An important lesson from the economic crisis of 2009 is that sustainable 
economic growth in the Eurozone is about both the demand and supply. There are four key 
priorities for reform in Europe: there is an increasing need in getting people to work, increase 
competition, unlocking business potential and supporting an innovative environment.155 In 
order to achieve this, EU Member States should make structural reforms which should 
contribute to economic flexibility and productivity growth. When they are not in place, fiscal 
policies are the only instruments in place to stabilize the economy which cannot be sustained 
over the long run. Fiscal space therefore becomes progressively exhausted.156  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
153 B. Cœuré, ‘’ Lamfalussy was right: independence and interdependence in a monetary union’’,  
154 European Commission, “Catching-up processes in the euro area”, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area Vol. 
12:1 (2013), 9-10.  
155 J. Trichet, ‘’ Structural reforms in Europe’’, 
oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1847/Structural_reforms_in_Europe.html, consulted at 10-04-2015. 
156 B. Cœuré, ‘’ Lamfalussy was right: independence and interdependence in a monetary union’’ 
44 
 
3.3: Summary 
The financial crisis highlighted the need for resilient domestic fiscal frameworks. While fiscal 
governance is also regulated on a supranational context, this chapter has focused on domestic 
fiscal governance. This perspective has gained more attention from analysts and policy-
makers in order to explain the different fiscal outcomes of member states while being 
subjected to the same supranational constraints.  
A good starting point is by recognizing the externality that democratically elected 
governments have a tendency to accumulate debt. This deficit and debt bias has several 
sources and are part of the theory of the political economy. Government spending is 
commonly targeted at specific groups in society while being financed from a general tax fund. 
The result is an incongruence between those who benefit and those who pay. Other sources to 
the deficit bias are the use pro-cyclical policies, the political cycle of a country and a 
fragmented budgetary policy.  
In order to combat this bias, the literature provides several instruments for 
governments to effectively combat deficit and spending biases. On an institutional level, 
governments have to strive for centralization of the budgetary process. This growing body of 
literature emphasizes that institutions governing the budget process are important 
determinants of a country’s fiscal performance. Unfortunately, besides the work of von Hagen 
and co-authors, there is little research on the choice of the form of fiscal governance. Other 
instruments are therefore more promising for further analyses. These instruments are 
independent forecasters, national fiscal rules and the use of a medium-term budgetary 
framework. The economic crisis further shown that structural reforms should contribute to 
economic flexibility and productivity growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Chapter four: Analysing the important elements on national fiscal frameworks in 
relation to the fiscal outcomes under the SGP.  
In the previous chapter has provided an overview about the main components that make up a 
resilient national fiscal framework. The European Commission currently monitors three of 
these components trough a database which is updated annually: 
1) National fiscal rules 
2) Independent fiscal institutions  
3) Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
The economic crisis has however shown that structural reforms on a national level are 
fundamental to ensure long sustainable growth while being closely linked with individual 
fiscal outcomes. The OECD provides several key indicators on this subject. I will therefore 
add an analyses on structural reforms to the upper list of components: 
4) Structural reforms. 
Through the analyses of these indicators, I will try to find a link between the structural 
patterns and the indicator scores. The hypothesis is thus that wrongdoers show weaknesses in 
their indicators in comparison with the well preforming member states. I will furthermore 
look if these results can be linked to the structural patterns outlined in chapter two. This will 
be done as follows:  
- For each instrument I will use a summarizing indicator for comparison purposes. The 
construction of this indicator and the selected time interval will be elaborated at the 
beginning of the paragraph.  
- In order to find out if the use of these instruments have increased in the EU-15 as a 
whole, I will start with a general observations paragraph.  
- From here, the analyses will reflect progress on the structural patterns: ‘large vs small’ 
and the PI(I)GS. 
- Lastly, a general conclusion will be drawn from these observations. 
There is however a problem with the categorization of Italy, as this country can be assigned as 
a large country as well as one of the PIIGS. In the following comparative tables, Italy will be 
categorized for both. Still, when considering that Italy is currently the third largest economy 
in EMU, I will discuss Italy in the ‘large group’. This does not mean that I exempt Italy from 
being one of the PIIGS. The general conclusions will elaborate on this subject if necessary. 
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Lastly, it is important to emphasize that the indicators from the European Commission are 
based on self-reporting trough a questionnaire and may not reflect actual experiences.157  
Chapter 4.1: National numerical fiscal rules. 
Fiscal rules pose a permanent constraint on fiscal policy trough the setting of numerical 
targets for budgetary aggregates. Their primary objective is to enhance budgetary discipline. 
The European Commission has compiled a dataset on domestic fiscal rules in force since 
1990 across EU countries.158 The data is obtained through a survey that covers all types of 
fiscal rules (budget balance rules, debt rules and expenditure- and revenue rules)159. The 
questionnaire requests information on several aspects of the rule: description, definition, 
coverage, statutory base, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and the experience with 
the respect of the rule.  
The strength of the fiscal rules are calculated by the European Commission trough a 
fiscal rule strength index (FRSI). In order to be effective, fiscal rules need to be composed out 
of appropriate characteristics. Most cited are the characteristics stipulated by Kopits and 
Symansky (see chapter 3.2.3). The DG ECOFIN however looks at the following features: 
(1)  The statutory base of the rule. 
(2)  The room for setting or revising its objectives. 
(3)  The body in charge of monitoring respect and enforcement of the rule. 
(4)  The enforcement mechanisms relating to the rule. 
(5)  The media visibility of the rule. 
The FRSI is calculated for each rule by aggregating the scores of the upper features.160 Next, 
the FRSI’s are used to construct a summary indicator for each member state trough a 
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comprehensive time-varying fiscal rule index for each Member State (FRI). The FRI is thus a 
single comprehensive score per country per year. It consists out of a summary of all fiscal rule 
strength indices in force in the respective member state weighted by the coverage of general 
government finances of the respective rule (i.e. public expenditure of the government sub 
sector(s) concerned by the rule over total general government expenditure).161  
The FRI will be used for comparison purposes in table nine. This table shows the FRI 
for the EU-15 Member States using a four year interval starting with the implementation of 
Maastricht in 1993. The benchmark is the EU-15 average, where below average scores are 
highlighted in red.  
Table 9: EU-15 results of the Fiscal Rule Index, 1993-2013.  
Country Structural 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 
  pattern             
B Small 0,4110 0,5209 0,0511 0,0511 0,0511 0,0855 
DK Small 0,2948 0,5473 1,3983 1,3983 1,5037 1,5301 
L Small -0,2990 -0,4992 0,9167 1,8405 1,8405 1,6949 
NL Small -1,0147 1,0020 1,0020 1,0020 1,0020 1,0746 
A Small -1,0147 -1,0147 0,2934 0,1732 0,7631 1,0740 
FIN Small -1,0147 0,2803 1,0775 1,0334 0,1906 0,3152 
S Small -1,0147 -0,0954 2,0081 2,0081 2,2847 2,2847 
D Big 0,3975 0,3975 0,3975 0,3975 1,1160 3,1964 
F Big -0,6557 -0,4532 -0,0043 -0,0043 0,9355 3,5396 
I Big/PIIGS -1,0147 -1,0147 0,0221 0,0221 -0,2676 -0,1949 
UK Big -1,0147 1,8600 1,8600 1,8600 -1,0147 1,5024 
EL PIIGS -1,0147 -1,0147 -1,0147 -1,0147 -1,0147 0,8707 
E PIIGS -0,3410 -0,3410 -0,3410 1,5884 1,4203 3,0457 
IRL PIIGS -1,0147 -1,0147 -0,9892 -0,7668 -0,7668 2,7502 
P PIIGS -1,0147 -1,0147 -1,0147 -0,1517 -0,0967 1,7486 
EU-15 
Average - -0,6216 -0,1236 0,3775 0,6291 0,5298 1,6345 
 
Source: European Commission, ‘’Fiscal rule database’’, 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm, consulted at 01-04- 
2015.  
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Chapter 4.1.1: General observations. 
 
The EU-15 FRI average shows a steady improvement since the implementation of Maastricht. 
Although a temporal deterioration of the FRI can be observed during the outbreak of the 
financial crisis, the member states have rebounded with an extraordinary increase. The 
deterioration during the outbreak of the financial crisis can be partially explained due to the 
suspension of the rules in force in the course of the economic and financial crisis.162 This is 
especially applicable for Finland and the UK. After 2009, the average FDI increases with a 
relatively strong pace as a consequence of the several initiatives that have been brought 
forward in order to strengthen the EU’s ﬁscal governance.163   
Chapter 4.1.2: The large countries. 
The large countries show mixed results. Italy can be seen as the worst performer of this group 
but is also one of the worst performers overall. Between 1993 and 2013, Italy showed only 
minor improvements of their FRI which deteriorated after the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
In fact, Italy is the only country who scored negative in 2013. Here, no numerical fiscal rules 
existed other than those of the SGP before the financial crisis.164 Fiscal rules are currently 
implemented due to the external constraints of Europe, but they still need to become 
effective.165  
In contrast to Italy, Germany remains stable and above average during the first years 
of the SGP, reflecting their traditional devotion to tight fiscal policies. The German federal- 
and regional governments are constitutionally obligated to adhere to a ‘golden rule’, in which 
borrowing should only finance capital expenditures. Further fiscal rules were implemented 
after 2009. One particular example is the so-called ‘Schuldenbremse’ or debt break.166 
France showed a relatively low FRI before 2005. However, in contrast to Italy, France 
improved significantly after 2005 and especially after the outbreak of the financial crisis. Still, 
France lacks clear credibility features in their rules. Targets are usually not treated as binding 
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and well-specified escape clauses are missing, therefore decreasing transparency and 
credibility.167  
 The UK is a remarkable outsider. Since 1997, they have had the strongest FRI of the 
EU-15 which deteriorated in 2009 due to the financial crisis. While a ‘code for fiscal stability’ 
was implemented in 1998 (embedding two fiscal rules, most notably a golden rule for public 
finances), this code was abandoned 10 years later in view of public finance deterioration.168 In 
response to the downturn, the UK government engaged in a short term fiscal stimulus, 
temporarily cutting taxes and bringing forward planned spending. Consequently, it has been 
argued that the fiscal rules have failed in the UK. A. Murray and G. Wilkes (2009) write that 
‘’ They did not systematically affect the government’s behaviour in fair times or foul. Politics 
determined the spending pattern of famine followed by feast that characterised Gordon 
Brown’s Chancellorship.’’169  
Chapter 4.1.3: The small countries.  
The small countries score relatively well on their FRI scores in comparison with the other 
groups although both Belgium and Austria follow different trajectories. One group of small 
countries show relatively steady improvements of their FRI’s between 1993 and 2013. This 
group consists out of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Finland is 
a remarkable outsider. Although initially following the same path, their FRI deteriorated since 
2005 towards one of the lowest scoring countries in 2013. This can be explained through the 
use of escape clauses as a consequence of a deteriorated economic environment due to the 
financial crisis. 
In contrast to these countries, Belgium and Austria had difficulties to sustain their 
improvement pattern and experienced phases of improvement and deterioration. Belgium 
started as one of the countries with the strongest FRI after the implementation of Maastricht. 
However, after 1997, their score deteriorated to a somewhat constant value below the EU-15 
average. Certain current- or former fiscal rules in Belgium are strictly complied with whereas 
in other cases there appears to be no connection between the rule and what actually happens. 
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There is still room for improvement.170 Consequently, Belgium shows one of the lowest FRI’s 
of the small countries.  
Austria’s FRI improved in the early years of the millennium, but could not sustain this 
growth pattern afterwards. Unfortunately, Austria’s fiscal framework has not been able to 
prevent state governments from consistently missing their budgetary targets from 2001 to 
2009, causing a significant drag on Austria’s overall budgetary position.171 In sum, the 
European Commission (2014) writes: ‘’ The Austrian experience seems to confirm the 
importance of combining well-designed fiscal rules with proper institutional arrangements 
able to provide an efficient incentive structure for subnational governments.’’172  
Chapter 4.1.4: The PI(I)GS. 
The PIIGS score considerably low on the FRI index until 2009. Both Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal had no effective numerical fiscal rules in place. For example, Ireland had three 
numerical fiscal rules in operation around 2011. Two expenditure rules applied for the central 
government and a budget balance rule existed for local governments. Still, the expenditure 
rules represented hardly any constraint in terms of spending containment. Moreover, targets 
of the budget balance rule have been missed regularly since 2007 and lacks a multiannual 
perspective.173 Greece and Portugal had no fiscal rules in place at all before the 
implementation of the fiscal compact.174 
 Spain is an outsider in this group. According to the European Commission (2012), the 
prevailing fiscal framework has been instrumental in promoting multi-annual fiscal planning 
and showed an overall good record. Spain’s fiscal framework relies on budgetary stability 
rules established in 2001. These rules allowed Spain to gradually improve fiscal balances and 
move from large deficits in the 1990’s to surpluses between 2005 and 2007 and a gradual fall 
in government debt. Still, despite these rules, Spain continued to pursue a tax-friendly growth 
consumption and benefited from rising assed prices and a falling interest burden. Even though 
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National Bank of Belgium Economic Review No.11 (2008), 76. 
171 R. Fargnoli, ‘’ Austria's fiscal rules: climbing the mountain towards effective fiscal relations’’, ECOFIN 
Country Focus Vol 11:1 (2014), 1. 
172 R. Fargnoli, ‘’ Austria's fiscal rules: climbing the mountain towards effective fiscal relations’’, 8. 
173 European Commission, ‘’ Fiscal frameworks across Member States: Commission services country fiches 
from the 2011 EPC peer review’’, 27. 
174 E. Bolva et.al., ‘’ Fiscal Rules at a Glance’’, IMF working paper No. 273 (2015), 31. 
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Spain’s FRI has been strong since 2005, it has experienced severe macroeconomic imbalances 
in the wake of the crisis.175 
Chapter 4.1.5: Summary  
While the EU-15 average FRI has been rising gradually during the SGP period, table 9 
indicates that this is mostly due to strong FRI’s of the small countries until the outbreak of the 
crisis. Weak FRI’s can be found in the large countries as well as the PIIGS. An exception for 
the large group is Germany while fiscal rules have not been effective in the UK and France. In 
Italy no fiscal rules existed other than those of the SGP before the outbreak of the financial 
crisis. This mixed pattern can also be observed for the PIIGS, where Spain can be seen as a 
positive outsider. Greece and Portugal both had no fiscal rules in place while fiscal rules in 
Ireland lacked credibility, representing hardly any constraints on spending or budget balance 
targets.  
 
 Table 9 therefore confirms the hypothesis, linking budgetary outcomes of structural 
patterns in chapter two with the use of numerical fiscal rules, although there are exceptions 
like Spain and Germany. This conclusion is also confirmed by the literature. In an empirical 
research on the link of national fiscal rules and fiscal discipline, X. Debrun et.al. (2008) 
conclude that there is a robust link between numerical fiscal rules and fiscal performance. 
They furthermore conclude that ‘’ the type and design of rules appear to matter for their 
effectiveness’’.176 This observation can be linked with the experienced outcomes in the UK 
and Ireland.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
175 European Commission, ‘’ Fiscal frameworks across Member States: Commission services country fiches 
from the 2011 EPC peer review’’, 121. 
176 X. Debrun et.al., ‘’ Tied to the Mast? National Fiscal Rules in the European Union’’, 343. 
52 
 
Chapter 4.2: Analysing the use of independent institutions.  
 
With a survey of 2006, the European Commission compiled a broad set of indicators on 
national independent fiscal institutions in the EU countries. 177 The compiled information 
reflects the mandates and functions of these institutions, composition of governing boards, 
formal status vis-à-vis the government or parliament and media visibility.178 The indicators of 
the survey are grouped in six sections: General description of the institution, mandate, 
role/function, composition, status, visibility.  
Although all these sections are important for an independent institution in order to 
work effectively, this analyses will focus on the number of institutions and their functions or 
roles as a basic indicator. The European Commission specifies four main roles, namely: the 
analysis of fiscal policy developments without normative judgement; the analysis of fiscal 
policy developments with normative judgement; the provision/endorsement of independent 
macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts; and the issuing of recommendations (considering 
policy alternatives) in the area of fiscal policy.  
From here, we can establish two basic roles with two institutional supplements. The 
two basic roles are (1) the analysis of fiscal policy developments without normative 
judgement and (2) the provision or endorsement of independent macroeconomic and/or 
budgetary forecasts. The importance of the latter was already stressed by The Council Report 
in March 2005 after the SGP reform, stating: ‘’it is important to base budgetary projections 
on realistic and cautious macroeconomic forecasts.’’179 Macroeconomic forecasts are 
fundamental for preparation of budgetary plans. These figures largely determine revenue 
projections that in return form the basis for expenditure plans.180 Institutions that provide the 
analysis of fiscal policy developments without normative judgement monitor whether fiscal 
developments are in line with the main fiscal policy objective of the government or with the 
traditional objective assigned to fiscal policy.181  
                                                             
177 This information is updated annually with the latest information coming from 2013.  
Source: ‘’ Independent fiscal institutions in the EU Member States’’ 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/independent_institutions/index_en.htm, 
consulted at 26-03-2015.  
178 ‘’ Independent fiscal institutions in the EU Member States’’, consulted at 26-03-2015. 
179 European Council, ‘’Council report’’, European Commission Press Release No. 7619 (2005) 
180 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2006’’, European Economy No. 3 (2006), 176. 
181 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2006’’, 170. 
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Institutional supplements to these basic roles are (3) the analysis of fiscal policy 
developments with normative judgement and (4) the issuing of recommendations (considering 
policy alternatives) in the area of fiscal policy. These institutions issue statements and 
recommendations on the appropriateness of specific policy measures. Most importantly, they 
have the ability to influence the public debate and raise reputational costs for the conduct of 
unsound policies.  
Table 10 shows the results on the establishment of independent institutions and their 
roles one year before the financial crisis (2008) in comparison with the latest data according 
to the survey (2013). The numbers used in the table reflect the institution in place for the 
given role or function. Where there is no institution in place, the figure is highlighted in red. 
Special attention goes out to the two basic functions as described above.  
4.2.1: Looking for structural patterns.  
The aftermath of the financial crisis led to an increase of independent fiscal institutes within 
the EU-15. This is however no coincidence. As from 2011, EU law requires the establishment 
of a technical and independent fiscal body within each member state.182 The aim is ensuring 
compliance with EU and national fiscal rules and avoiding the deterioration of public 
finances.183 Before the crisis, twelve of the EU-15 member states had established independent 
institutions. Member states without were Ireland, Finland and Italy. Still, as table 10 indicates, 
many of the institutions implemented were missing fundamental basic roles. This will further 
be reflected in the paragraphs below. The remaining member states however all implemented 
independent institutions after the outbreak of the crisis. A substantial increase of institutions 
that provide analysis of fiscal policy developments with normative judgement and the 
provision/endorsement of independent macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts can be 
observed by 2013 in comparison with 2008.  
  
 
                                                             
182 Directive 2011/85/EU 
183 P. Lampreave, ‘’ The New Regulatory Framework in the European Union and the Role of the Independent 
Fiscal Authority’’, Bulletin for international taxation Vol 67:11 (2013), 592.  
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4.2.2: The large countries 
By 2008, Italy remained the only ‘large’ member state without any independent forecaster. 
Both Germany and France had independent institutions implemented by 2008 providing all of 
the basic roles. This is however not applicable for the UK. Before 2008, the UK only had a 
National Audit Office (established in 1983) in place for the non-binding purpose of 
scrutinizing costings of policy measures that are produced by the Government. The UK did 
implemented an independent Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010, providing both 
analysis on fiscal policy and on macroeconomic/budgetary forecasts. A Parliamentary Budget 
Office in Italy was established by 2012, who’s mandated to asses underlying assumptions of 
fiscal and macroeconomic projections as well as public finance sustainability, although it does 
not provide policy recommendations.184  
4.2.3: The small countries 
Most of the small countries had independent institutions in place of which some are relatively 
old, for example, the High Council of Finance in Belgium is created in 1936 and evolved 
along with the transition towards federalism in a context of sustained fiscal consolidation. 
Other ‘veterans’ are the Belgium Federal Planning Bureau, the Netherlands’s Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analyses (CPB) and Denmark’s Economic Council. New institutions have 
emerged since the late 1990’s in Sweden (Swedish Fiscal Policy Council) and in Austria 
(Austria’s Debt Committee).185 These institutions all provided basic roles by 2008. Within 
this group of countries, Finland can be characterised as a remarkable outsider. While they are 
seen as one of the most disciplined countries throughout the EU-15, they implemented their 
independent institution relatively late. By 2013, all Member States of this group had 
implemented independent institutions who provided both fiscal analysis and macroeconomic 
and/or budgetary forecasts.  
4.2.4: The PI(I)GS 
As Ireland remained the only country in this group without any independent institution by 
2008, most of the PIGS had institutions in place but only with a limited amount of (basic) 
roles or tasks. This is especially applicable for Spain and Portugal. Although they had 
institutions in place, none of them carried out any of the basic roles. Portugal had two 
                                                             
184 Senate Budget Service, ‘’ Establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office’’, Nota breve No. 2 (2013), 2. 
185 X. Debrun and K. Takahashi, ‘’ Independent fiscal councils in continental Europe: Old wine in a new 
Bottle?’’, CESifo DICE Report No. 3 (2011), 46. 
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independent institutions in place before 2008, but even in 2013 there were no institutions that 
provided independent macroeconomic and/or budgetary forecasts. Within this group, only 
Greece had an institution in place that carried out both of the basic tasks without the 
providence of normative statements and recommendations by 2008. Still, this institute has 
been proved ineffective in controlling the deficit and debt biases of the Greek government 
(see chapter five). 
By 2013, independent institutions were established in every Member State of the 
PIGS. With the exception of Portugal, all of these institutions are now providing independent 
analyses on fiscal policy and macroeconomic/budgetary forecasts. Progression efforts were 
speeded up through the implementation of the Directive on the requirements on budgetary 
frameworks in 2011.  
4.2.5: Summary  
The post-crisis period entailed an increase of independent fiscal institutions throughout the 
EU-15 Member States. While by 2008 Finland, Italy and Ireland were the only Member States 
without any independent institutions, especially the PIIGS (Italy included) and the large 
countries (including the UK) lacked institutions providing basic tasks. Table 10 thus confirms 
that weak budgetary outcomes under the SGP can be linked with the structural patterns of 
wrongdoers with the exceptions of Germany and France.  
By 2013, independent institutions were implemented across all of the EU-15 Member 
States. Italy and Ireland however, still do not have institutions in place providing fiscal policy 
analyses whereas Portugal still needs an institution that provides macroeconomic and/or 
budgetary forecasts. The progression on the establishment of these institutes can be explained 
due to the implementation of the Directive on the requirements on budgetary frameworks of 
2011.  
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Chapter 4.3: Medium term budgetary frameworks 
The SGP reform in 2005 included country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTO’s) for all Member States, complemented with some simple provisions relating to the 
appropriate speed of adjustment towards the MTOs. From here, several studies have already 
demonstrated the potential benefits of medium term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs), notably 
on fiscal discipline (see chapter 3.2.4).186 Just like the national numerical fiscal rules and 
independent institutions, the quality of MTBFs are annually assed trough a medium-term 
budgetary frameworks index.187 The aim of this chapter is to link the strength of the MTBFs 
with the SGP results of the EU-15 Member States.  
 In line with the SGP reform in 2005, the European Commission launched a first 
survey in 2006 in order to evaluate the quality of MTBFs in the Member States. In contrast 
with 2000, almost every EU-15 Member State had complemented their fiscal institutions with 
a national MTBF in 2006. The only exceptions were Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece and 
Portugal.188 The European Commission assesses the quality of MTBFs according to five 
dimensions:189 
(1) Existence of a domestic MTFB.    
(2) Connectedness between the multi-annual budgetary targets and the preparation of 
the annual budget. 
(3) Involvement of national parliaments in the preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plans 
(4) Existence of coordination mechanisms between general government layers prior to 
setting the medium term budgetary targets. 
(5) Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of multi-annual budgetary targets. 
 
The quality of medium term budgetary frameworks are analysed trough a calculation taking 
into account the existence and properties of national MTBFs along the upper five dimensions. 
Thereafter, the scores are combined following the same methodology as the Fiscal Rule Index 
                                                             
186 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2007’’, European Economy No.3 (2007), 149. 
187 ‘’ Fiscal governance in the EU Member States’’, 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/index_en.htm, consulted at 06-04-2015.  
188 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2007’’, European Economy No.3 (2007), 156. 
189 For more information on the quality features: European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2007’’, 
European Economy No.3 (2007), 187. 
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(FRI).190 The benchmark is the average EU-15 MTBF strength where surpasses are 
highlighted in red.  
Chapter 4.3.1: Looking for structural patterns.  
Table 10 shows the MTBF index scores of 2006, 2008 and 2013. The data indicates that the 
overall quality of the EU-15 MTBFs has increased. Still, progress was much slower than 
expected before the outbreak of the financial crisis. Between 2006 and 2008, only France 
adopted some significant changes. The European Commission concludes in their Report on 
Public Finances of 2009: ‘’ (…) the broad-based weaknesses in Member States' MTBFs 
identified in the 2006 survey still apply in 2008. These include poor monitoring mechanisms 
and lack of predefined measures in case budgetary developments depart from medium-term 
budgetary objectives.’’191  
 The financial crisis initiated a growing consensus on the desirability of adding the 
multiannual dimension to budgetary planning. Consequently, many EU Member States 
introduced new MTBFs into their legal order or substantially upgraded the existing 
arrangements. This process was further accelerated due to the Budgetary Framework 
Directive, which obliged the Member States to have MTBFs in their framework by the end of 
2013. 192  Table 11 confirms this progress. The EU-15 average increased to 1.5 in 2013 and 
with the exception of Luxembourg, all of the EU-15 have MTBFs in place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
190 See chapter 4.2 
191 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2009’’, 99. 
192 Ibidem, 74. 
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Table 11: EU-15 results of the MTBF strength index, 2006-2008-2013.  
 
Source: European Commission, ‘’ Medium-term budgetary framework database’’, 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/framework/index_en.htm, consulted at 08-04-
2015.  
Chapter 4.3.2: The large countries.  
This group of countries all scored above average in the 2006 MTBF index. There is however 
one exception, France. By 2008 however, they had managed to recover and had turned their 
relatively weak MTBF index into the strongest by 2013. Italy also strengthened their MTBF 
index by 2008 but did not show an improvement after the outbreak of the financial crisis. This 
in contrary to Germany and the United Kingdom. They saw an increase of their MTBF index 
after 2013.  
Chapter 4.3.3: The small countries. 
Within this third group of countries, Luxembourg remains an extraordinary outsider. They 
adopted a multi-annual financial programming law in October 2014 as the last EU-15 
Member State without an MTBF by 2013.193 The poor strength of their index does however 
not correspond with their compliance on the SGP. Luxembourg is one of the EU-15 countries 
with the lowest government debt and -deficits (see chapter two). More remarkable is the 
average progression on MTBF index strength of the small countries. While the bigger 
                                                             
193 European Commission, ‘’ Country Report Luxembourg 2015’’, Commission Staff Working Document No. 35 
final/2 (2015), 11. 
Country Structural pattern MTBF index, 2006. MTBF index, 2008. MTBF index, 2013.
B Small 1,4 1,4 1,4
DK Small 1,6 1,4 1,8
L Small 0,4 0,4 0,4
NL Small 1,6 1,6 1,8
A Small 1,6 1,6 1,6
FIN Small 1,6 1,4 1,4
S Small 1,6 1,6 1,4
D Big 1,4 1,4 1,6
F Big 1,0 1,6 2,0
I Big/PIIGS 1,4 1,6 1,6
UK Big 1,4 1,4 1,6
EL PIIGS 0,4 0,4 1,8
ES PIIGS 1,6 1,6 1,8
IRL PIIGS 0,6 0,6 1,2
P PIIGS 0,4 0,4 1,6
EU-15 Average 1,2 1,2 1,5
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countries and the PIGS show signs of progression, most of the smaller countries showed none 
or even deteriorated. By 2013, only Denmark and the Netherlands improved their index in 
comparison with 2006. 
Chapter 4.3.4: The PIGS. 
In 2006, which marked the start of the MTBF survey of the Commission, especially the PIGS 
show poor results on the MTBF index. The only exception is Spain. Spain implemented 
Budgetary Stability Laws (BSL) in 2001 and 2007 in order to target fiscal balance over the 
cycle for the general government, excluding the social security system.194 Still, in comparison 
with the other PIGS, this can be seen as exceptional. Greece for example, introduced their 
Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS) by law in 2010195 and a completely new MTBF was 
introduced in 2011. Ireland’s processes of economic and budgetary governance are now under 
active review at EU level, and a number of commitments were set out in the National 
Recovery Plan 2011-2014. As from 2011, Ireland also has a MTBF that set out the medium-
term parameters for budgetary policy.196 Portugal introduced an MTBF in 2012 that obliges 
the government to annually submit to the parliament a draft law on a budgetary multi-year 
planning.197 Table 10 shows an increase of the MTBF index for all the PIGS in 2013. Only 
Ireland remains below average. More importantly, some of these countries managed to reform 
their strength index to one of the best in the EU-15 by 2013.  
Chapter 4.3.5: Summary 
The use of MTBFs is a relatively new concept. Used to extend the horizon of the annual 
budget, only a limited amount of EU-15 countries have been using MTBFs in their legal 
constellation and budgetary practices. Also available data and empirical studies on the use of 
MTBFs are limited. As part of the SGP reform in 2005, the European Commission 
constructed a MTBF strength index which is updated annually. 
 Table 11 shows that especially the PIIGS were missing MTBF’s (with the exception of 
Spain), while the other large and small countries (with the exception of Luxembourg) all had 
MTBF’s implemented by 2006. The hypothesis thus excludes the large countries while it is 
                                                             
194 E.J. Lundback, ‘’ Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks – Lessons for Austria from International 
Experience’’, IMF Working Paper Series WP/08/163 (2008), 29.  
195 Law 3871/2010. 
196 Department of Finance, ‘’ Reforming Ireland’s Budgetary Framework’’ A Discussion Document No. 1 
(2011), iii. 
197 European Commission, ‘’Public finances in EMU – 2014’’, European Economy No.9 (2014), 74. 
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confirmed for the PIIGS, including Italy. The post-crisis period entailed an increase of the 
MTBF strength index were most notably the PIIGS saw a substantial increase of strength. In 
contrast to this progression, there is still room for improvement, especially in the small 
countries. Here, MTBF’s have lost strength due to the financial crisis were multiannual 
planning had to be loosened in order to deal with country-specific shocks.  
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4.4: Structural reforms. 
The European Union is currently using more supportive macroeconomic policies in order to 
enhance growth. Examples are the expended asset purchasing programmes of the ECB, a 
more flexible interpretation of the SGP as well as a lower exchange rate. Although it looks 
like these measures are having effect, Europe must not use this as an excuse to postpone 
essential structural reforms to both labour and product markets that can raise long-term 
output, ensure employment creation and sustainably raise European living standards. 198 
Today, there is a continuing lack of consistent reform implementation across the EU (see 
chapter 3.2.4). Europe is especially falling behind in terms of competiveness.199 As (southern) 
countries have lost competiveness and can no longer devaluate against their euro-zone trading 
partners, structural reforms are vital to ensure higher growth and declining debt burdens.200  
There are three main categories of structural reform policies: enhancing competition, 
promoting business activity and improving labour markets.201 In order to find a link between 
structural reforms and fiscal outcomes, table 11 shows scores on key indicators between 2008 
and 2013 for the EU-15 countries obtained from the OECD database. In this database, the 
OECD monitors a set of quantitative indicators that allow for a comparison of policy settings 
across countries.202 With regard to the three main categories listed above, indicators are 
picked which are essential to economic flexibility and productivity growth: indicators on 
employment regulation and barriers to entrepreneurship. The benchmark is the OECD average 
where surpasses are highlighted in red.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
198 Business Europe, ‘’Still lacking consistent reform across Europe’’, Reform Barometer spring 2015, 4. 
199 China’s labour productivity has grown with more than 10 per cent between 2001 and 2013. For India, this 
figure is almost 5 per cent. When comparing, EU’s productivity has grown with just 1 per cent between 2001 and 
2013.  
200 The Economist, ‘’ Structural reform in southern Europe: Patchy progress’’, economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21601008-some-signs-improvement-must-try-harder-patchy-progress, consulted at 10-04-2015. 
201 The Economist, ‘’ Structural reform in southern Europe: Patchy progress’’, economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21601008-some-signs-improvement-must-try-harder-patchy-progress, consulted at 10-04-2015. 
202 The OECD, ‘’Going for growth: structural policy indicators’’, oecd.org/eco/goingforgrowth.htm, consulted at 
11-04-2015. 
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Chapter 4.4.1: Looking for structural patterns. 
Table 11 confirms a lack of consistent reform implementations across the EU-15 countries. 
This is especially applicable for reforms on employment protection in order to ensure open, 
mobile and dynamic labour markets.203 The competitive indicators on barriers to 
entrepreneurship shows an overall improvement in comparison with 2008, but the pace of 
reform is still marginal in most of the EU-15 countries. According to the business reform 
barometer of spring 2015, the costs of starting a business in the EU is still more than three 
times as high in comparison with the US whereas it takes about twice as long to set up a 
company in the EU. Consequently, there is still a need to simplify procedures and decrease 
administrative burdens in order to support business start-ups and companies expansion.204 
Table 12: Indicators on structural reform in the EU-15, 2008-2013. 
 
Source: The OECD, ‘’Going for growth: structural policy indicators’’, oecd.org/eco/goingforgrowth.htm, 
consulted at 11-04-2015. 
 
 
 
                                                             
203 Business Europe, ‘’Still lacking consistent reform across Europe’’, Reform Barometer spring 2015, 5. 
204 Business Europe, ‘’Still lacking consistent reform across Europe’’, 4. 
Country Structural pattern Employment protection Employment protection Barriers to Barriers to 
legislation: (regular) legislation: (temporary) entrepreneurship: entrepreneurship:
Complexity of regulatory Administrative burden
procedures on startups
2008  -  2013 2008  -  2013 2008  -  2013 2008  -  2013
B Small 2.08   -  2.08 2.42   -  2.42 2.47   -  1.47 2.55   -  2.53
DK Small 2.03   -  2.10 1.79   -  1.79 2.03   -  1.28 1.38   -  1.30
L Small 2.28   -  2.28 3.83   -  3.83 1.39   -  1.41 2.46   -  2.40
NL Small 2.90   -  2.84 1.17   -  1.17 1.10   -  1.08 1.53   -  1.25
A Small 2.12   -  2.12 2.17   -  2.17 1.03   -  1.02 2.44   -  2.01 
FIN Small 2.38   -  2.38 1.88   -  1.88 1.61   -  1.63 1.79   -  1.74
S Small 2.52   -  2.52 0.79   -  1.17 2.77   -  2.77 1.58   -  1.45
D Large 2.72   -  2.72 1.54   -  1.75 2.52   -  2.00 1.78   -  1.62
F Large 2.67   -  2.60 3.75   -  3.75 1.38   -  1.57 2.49   -  2.16
I Large/PIIGS 2.80   -  2.41 2.71   -  2.71 0.38   -  0.52 2. 43  -  2.14
UK Large 1.25   -  1.11 0.42   -  0.54 3.10   -  2.46 1.42   -  1.33
EL PIIGS 2.69   -  2.07 3.17   -  2.92 3.08   -  2.07 3.16   -  2.37
ES PIIGS 2.22   -  1.95 3.50   -  3.17 2.84   -  2.83 2.58   -  2.34
IRL PIIGS 1.13   -  1.50 0.71   -  1.21 3.36   -  3.37 1.42   -  1.49
P PIIGS 4.17   -  3.01 2.29   -  2.33 1.41   -  0.41 2.82   -  2.48
OECD Benchmark N/A 2.15   -  2.03 2.06   -  2.08 2.16   -  1.90 2.09   -  1.87
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Chapter 4.4.2: The large countries 
The large countries show almost no progression towards reforms on the employment 
legislation by 2013 in comparison with 2008. They furthermore all remain above the OECD 
benchmark with regard to employment legislation, although this is not the case for Germany 
on temporary employment legislation. Progression is especially needed in France and Italy. 
The UK remains an outsider, where legislation on regular- as well as temporary employment 
legislation is one of the most flexible throughout the EU-15 countries.  
 The progression on reforms for barriers to entrepreneurship is mixed in this group of 
countries. Both in Germany and the UK, who experienced a relatively high indicator in 2008, 
showed progression on both the complexity of regulatory legislation as well as the 
administrative burden. This is however not the case for Italy and France although their 
complexity is low in comparison with the OECD benchmark.  
Chapter 4.4.3: The small countries 
The smaller countries also showed almost no progression on the reform indicators although 
they stay the strongest group on the indicators of barriers to entrepreneurship.  In the 
Netherlands business federations continue to be satisfied with their country reforms. This in 
sharp contrast with Sweden and Finland. Although they are traditionally very competitive due 
to strong growth and employment performance, there is a substantial risk of losing ground as 
a result of failure to maintain a leading business environment.205  Moreover, regular 
employment regulation remains to be high in these countries. This is also the case for 
temporal employment in Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria.  
Chapter 4.4.4: The PIGS 
The PIGS still lack behind on structural reforms with regard to both employment protection 
and barriers to entrepreneurship although they do show improvement, especially in 
comparison with the other EU-15 countries. The PIGS are showing stronger progression 
towards more flexibility on both regular- as temporary employment legislation and barriers to 
entrepreneurship. This is especially the case for Portugal on this particular set of indicators, 
which can be contributed to their assistance and adjustment programs.206  
                                                             
205 Business Europe, ‘’Still lacking consistent reform across Europe’’, 5. 
206 Ibidem, 5. 
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 In 2008, especially Portugal scored high on the protection of regular employment 
legislation whereas the same is applicable for Spain and Greece on the temporary employment 
indicator. By 2013, there is still a need for improvement as these countries can no longer 
boost short-term competitiveness trough currency evaluation. Progression towards flexible 
labour markets are therefore more than welcome in these countries.207 Ireland still remains an 
outsider when looking to table 11. Here, indicators on both temporary and regular 
employment legislation remains one of lowest ranking EU-15 countries by 2013.  
 The PIGS can also be characterized in 2008 as those countries with the highest barriers 
to entrepreneurship. Complexity of regulations are far off the OECD benchmark in Greece, 
Spain and Ireland as well as the administrative burden. This in contrast to Portugal, where the 
complexity of regulations is one of the lowest by 2008 although the administrative burden is 
still relatively high. By 2013, the progression on reforms is patchy. Where Greece showed an 
improvement on both the indicators, progression is only marginal in the rest of the PIGS.  
Chapter 4.4.5: Summary 
Although the PIGS improved their reform implementation, there is still a need for the EU-15 
Member States to step up. Table 11 confirms this notion. In contrast to the PIGS, there is 
almost no significant improvement by 2013 for both the large and the small countries in 
barriers to entrepreneurship and the labour market. The PIGS did however experience the 
highest barriers for the labour market and business environment in 2008. It remains important 
for these countries to step up reform measures as short term competitiveness can no longer be 
boosted with currency devaluation. Continued reforms might be socially challenging for these 
governments, especially labour reforms, but they contribute to an economic recovery on the 
long term.  
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Chapter 4.5: Summary of the research 
The outbreak of the financial crisis has exposes several institutional shortcomings on a 
national level. In return, the literature provides a number of instruments for governments to 
combat the deficit and debt bias. This chapter will try to find a link on budgetary outcomes 
and the use of these instruments on a national level, namely the use of:  
1) Numerical fiscal rules 
2) Independent fiscal institutions 
3) Medium-term budgetary framework 
4) Structural reforms 
Indicators are used both from the European Commission and the OECD where the 
benchmarks are set on the EU-15 and OECD averages. The indicators are used to construct an 
overall indicator for comparative purposes between the structural patterns of chapter two. Can 
we link the structural patterns of budgetary outcomes under the SGP with the weaknesses of 
fiscal frameworks on a national level?  
 The general outcome of this research does indicate a link between the strength of 
domestic fiscal frameworks and budgetary outcomes, although there are some exceptions. The 
hypothesis is particularly difficult in order to explain the structural pattern of the ‘large’ 
countries, most notably in the case of France and Germany. Both countries have shown no 
considerable deviations on all of these instruments in comparison with the small countries 
although the Scandinavian countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands show better scores. 
Italy and the UK are outsiders, where numerical rules have not been effective (in particular in 
the UK) and independent institutions absent, before the outbreak of the financial crisis.   
 The results do show particular shortcomings for the PIIGS, including Italy. Here, 
domestic fiscal frameworks were still inefficient and underdeveloped while these countries 
showed a low compliance on the budgetary targets of the SGP. One country stands out, Spain. 
This country has shown progression on all of the upper instruments, although it does not 
guarantee success. In the wake of the crisis, Spain has experienced considerable 
macroeconomic difficulties in combination with a full banking crisis.  
 Lastly, it is still important for the EU-15 as a whole to step up progression on 
structural reforms. While Europe is falling behind in terms of competitiveness and 
productivity, almost all of the countries are still showing high values in comparison with the 
OECD indicator benchmarks. More interestingly, progression is most strong in the PIIGS, 
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although this might be the result of their more troubled economies and more urgent 
competitiveness problems.   
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Chapter 5: Case studies. 
Chapter four indicates that there are considerable differences to be found in the strength of the 
domestic fiscal frameworks of the EU-15 countries. These in-depth reviews will reflect two of 
the EU-15 member states. The first case study will be aimed at a well-behaved member state 
whereas the second will analyse a wrongdoer. 
Table 13: Excessive deficits according to the results of chapter one, 1999-2013. 
Country. Number of excessive deficits   Number of excessive deficits  
  in general deficit/surplus. in general government gross debt. 
      
Belgium 4   (2009-2012) 15 (1997-2013) 
Denmark 5   (2005-2008, 2012) None-existent.  
Germany 6   (2001-2005, 2009-2010) 11 (2003-2013) 
Greece 15 (1999-2013) 15 (1999-2013) 
Spain 6   (2008-2013) 5   (1999, 2010-2013) 
France 10 (2001-2005, 2008-2013) 11 (2003-2013) 
Ireland 6   (2008-2013) 5   (2009-2013) 
Italy 9   (2001-2006, 2009-2012) 15 (1999-2013) 
Luxembourg Non-existent.  None-existent.  
NL 4   (2009-2012) 9   (2005-2013) 
Austria 3   (2004, 2009-2010) 9   (1999-2004, 2011-2013) 
Portugal 13 (2000-2006, 2008-2013) 10 (2004-2013) 
Finland Non-existent.  None-existent.  
Sweden Non-existent.  1   (1999) 
UK 9   (2003-2005, 2008-2013) 5   (2009-2013) 
 
Source: Eurostat, ‘’ Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data’’, 
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/data/main-tables, consulted at 09-03-2015. 
The selection will be based on the compliance results of chapter two where the Maastricht 
criteria will be applied in a strictly manner. Outcomes will therefore not reflect the established 
excessive deficits according to the ECOFIN Council, as this approach might lack a certain 
degree of objectivity.208  
Table 13 therefore lists the consecutive number of excessive deficits for the budget 
and gross debt on an annual basis. From here, both Finland and Luxembourg are considered 
as the well performers whereas Greece stands out as the wrongdoer. For the purposes of this 
research, it will be desirable to compare countries that have (somewhat) comparable 
characteristics. Finland is therefore the best candidate to compare with Greece. For example, 
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the GDP of Greece reached 248.89 billion US Dollar in 2013. For Finland this was 247.14 
billion in 2013. Luxembourg only accounts for 55.14 billion dollar in 2013.209  The following 
case studies will therefore reflect Finland as a well-performer whereas Greece will be 
analysed as a wrongdoer.  
Chapter 5.1: Finland 
Just a few years before the launch of the EMU, in the early 1990’s, Finland was hit by a 
severe recession. The country experienced a major bank crisis, unemployment rates 
deteriorated to over 15 per cent and the government debt raised from modest levels to about 
60 per cent of GDP.210 By 1995, the Ministry of Finance issued a report in which it argued 
that if policies remained the same, the overall debt would rise 30 per cent more to about 90 
per cent of GDP.211 How did Finland manage to recover and turnaround fiscal policy to one of 
the best preforming Member States on the SGP?  
5.1.1: The economic crisis of the early 1990’s. 
Until the early 1990’s, the Finish budget policy was characterized by stability.  It maintained 
regular budget surpluses and government debt around 20 per cent of GDP. It furthermore 
experienced stable growth levels during the recession of the late 70’s and early 80’s while 
other western European counterparts where severely hit.212 This success came to an abrupt in 
the early 1990’s. Finland encountered a severe economic recession which can be 
characterized as ‘’a tale of bad luck and bad policies’’.213 By the end of the 1980’s, the Finish 
government had ended capital controls and abolished restrictions on bank lending rates, which 
led to a flood of capital into the market. As a consequence of a deteriorating economic 
environment throughout the OECD countries, an abrupt decline in Finland’s exports 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, high interest rates and an appreciation of the 
Finnish markka (FM) in the early 1990’s, capital flowed out of the country just as freely as it 
came in.214 The failure to reform regulatory schemes of the financial markets and the decision 
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to leave tax systems unchanged when financial markets experienced deregulation were clear 
policy mistakes.215 
5.1.2: The birth of the Finnish ‘miracle’ in the 1990’s  
A new government came in place in 1995, who started the design of a fiscal consolidation 
plan in order to tackle the explosion of debt accumulation and increased deficits. An 
important motivation behind this program were the requirements for a membership in the 
EMU, which came closer after becoming a member of the EU in the beginning of that year 
(M. Hallerberg, 2004; S. Honkapohja, E. Koskela and R. Uusitalo, 2006). A new Social 
Democratic proposal was adopted that reduced government spending of around 20 billion FM 
and the coalition negotiated a level of spending cuts per ministry for four years.216 These 
fiscal consolidation plans in combination with a systematic execution and the improvement of 
monetary credibility in the form of inflation targeting were crucial for the turnaround and 
resumption of economic growth in Finland in the mid 1990’s.  217 
 The period that followed can be characterized by strong growth and structural reforms. 
From 1994, Finland encountered rapid economic recovery. The most important reason for the 
increased growth was the increase of labour productivity due to the increase in the skill-level 
of the labour force. The Nordic welfare state has a strong focus on education, which is free all 
the way to the university level. These safety nets were particularly important for dealing with 
high unemployment during the crisis. Unemployment benefits were linked with getting 
additional education which in return helped to restructure the economy toward high-
technology industries. 218  
Additionally, an industrial policy was chased that supported R&D and related 
innovative activities at the micro level. In summary, ‘’ the Finnish system of innovation was 
characterized by public-private partnerships, consensus-building, and dense networking 
among companies, universities, and research organizations.’’219 Finland followed an atypical 
pattern of industrial development transitioning from a nature-resource based economy into 
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one that relies heavily on high technology and knowledge. Nokia and Linux are examples of 
success, which grew to global giants in less than a decade. 220  
The combination of reskilling the labour force and providing fertile grounds for high 
tech industries turned out to be effective. But Finland is also characterized with other 
elements that contributed to this success. First, next to the build-up of a knowledge based 
economy, good public governance can also be contributed to the success of Finland. This 
country is traditionally known for being one of the least corrupt societies combined with a 
good public infrastructure and an efficiently functioning administration. Secondly, there is the 
high degree of coordination across different parts of government, and between the 
government and society. Thirdly, Finland can be characterized with a strong tradition of 
encouraging domestic competition. 221  
5.1.3: The reform of the Finish fiscal framework in the 1990’s 
The consolidation program of the Finnish government eventually led to smaller deficits and a 
decline of government debt as a result of strong fiscal consolidation based on the restrain of 
public spending. The adjustment was supported by a number of institutional reforms, of which 
the key components were: 
1) A medium-term framework for central government expenditure, with annual ceilings 
for individual ministers.  
2) Formal spending and taxation autonomy for local governments, who in practice tend 
to observe a balanced budget rule (although formally not in place). 
3) A comprehensive and mandatory social security system, under partly private 
management but subjected to public regulation.222  
 
Most important for Finland’s expenditure management system was the implementation of 
a medium term budgetary framework in 1991.223 Former separate processes of multi-year 
planning and annual budget preparation were merged into a single medium-term expenditure 
framework. The design of the framework was compromised out of a maximum level of total 
central government expenditure and expenditure ceilings for each ministry, both covering the 
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budget year and the two following years.224  The experience with this new framework can be 
assessed as positive. While the cumulative real GDP growth between 1992 and 1998 was over 
20 percent, two successive governments have been able to limit the primary spending of the 
general government. As a consequence, the total expenditure ratio dropped from 59 percent of 
GDP in 1993 to less than 50 percent in 1998. This successive expenditure restraint was 
therefore a key factor in the strengthening of Finland’s fiscal position after the recession in the 
early 1990’s.225  
5.1.4: Finland’s economic performance after the introduction of the euro 
Finland’s economic performance stands out among the EMU economies. It has been able to 
meet the Maastricht criteria every year since the introduction of the euro which can be 
contributed to strong public institutions, good governance, a strong rule of law and a well-
educated labour force. More specifically, Finland has been one of the most competitive 
economies in the world. 226 In 2015, this country has been ranked 9th in the Doing Business 
Indicator227 and 3rd in the Global Competitive Index of 2013-2014228.  This helped Finland to 
maintain a steady growth of GDP between 1998 and 2008, but the outbreak of the financial 
crisis has put growth into a slowdown (see figure 2).  
 This slowdown is reflecting an unfavourable external environment but also some 
fundamental weaknesses. Exports are falling due to the lesser demand in traditional exports 
like paper and pulp (as a consequence of the global shift from paper to electronics) and a 
lesser demand in electronics (Nokia). Also the current economic crisis in Russia has (again) 
struck another blow to the Finnish export market due to worldwide trade restrictions.229 
Furthermore, as a consequence of high wage growth and a decline in labour productivity, 
there is a decline in growth per capita, which is problematic for the aging society.230 
 Several critical areas in Finland are therefore ripe for reform. The first are pension 
reforms. Here, a dialogue between stakeholders, including social partners, can avoid 
unnecessary delays in terms of legislation and implementation. Second, an increased spending 
                                                             
224 IMF, ‘’Finland: Selected Issues’’, 14. 
225 Ibidem, 16. 
226 IMF, ‘’Finland: Selected Issues’’, IMF country report No. 14:140 (2014), 15. 
227 Doing Business, doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/finland/, consulted at 18-04-2015. 
228 World economic forum, weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014, consulted at 18-04-
2015. 
229 Reuters, ‘’ Taste of its own medicine? Austerity overshadows Finland vote’’, 
reuters.com/article/2015/04/12/us-finland-election-idUSKBN0N30JK20150412, consulted at 20-04-2015. 
230 IMF, ‘’Finland: Selected Issues’’, IMF country report No. 14:140 (2014), 16. 
73 
 
on active labour market policies, especially targeted at older people. Third, a gradual 
reduction of unemployment benefits in order to increase labour supply. This can be 
particularly effective when implemented during a period of strong demand. Forth, product 
market reforms, especially in the retail sector in which regulatory barriers are among the 
highest out of the OECD countries.231 Together, these structural reforms have the potential to 
enhance economic growth while mitigating the impact of fiscal consolidation, which is 
currently pursued by the government in order to cope with the aftermath of the financial 
crisis.  
Figure 2: Finland’s GDP growth rate, 1998-2014. 
 
Source: Trading economics, tradingeconomics.com/finland/gdp-growth, consulted at 18-04-2015.  
5.1.5: Reforms of the Finnish fiscal framework in the early 2000’s. 
The current fiscal framework in Finland has been established in 2003 and is anchored around 
multi-annual expenditure ceilings, mirroring the previous fiscal framework of 1991. The 
system is linked to parliamentary terms (four years) and experience with the framework 
suggests that governments abide by the rules.232 This helped the successive governments to 
effectively pursue consolidation of public finances, especially during good times.233  As a 
consequence, Finland has been able to sustain levels of debt and deficits well below the 
criteria of Maastricht. By 2013, the consolidated gross debt of the government was 56 per cent 
                                                             
231 IMF, ‘’Finland: Selected Issues’’ (2014), 50. 
232 European Commission, ‘’ Fiscal frameworks across Member States: Commission services country fiches 
from the 2011 EPC peer review’’, European Economy Occasional Papers 91 (2012), 129. 
233 See table 7 of chapter three. 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
4
Finland GDP growth rate.
74 
 
while even during the crisis general government deficits did not exceed the 3 per cent 
reference value.234  
 The consolidation programme is a core element of the current government for 2011 to 
2015 and is translated into a fiscal rule setting government spending limits. These expenditure 
ceilings cover 80 per cent of the central government budget. The exclusion of several items 
like unemployment assistance, housing allowances and interest payments are crucial to allow 
automatic stabilizers on the expenditure side to work. Programmes are formulated through a 
public agreement between coalition partners that is submitted to parliament as a government 
statement and thus relies heavily on political commitments.235  
 Although the experience with this framework has been positive, the previous chapter 
shows several institutional shortcomings in Finland. First, the fiscal rule index of chapter four 
(table 9) shows a relatively low figure in comparison with the other EU-15 countries. 
Although government spending limits are covered by a fiscal rule, neither balanced budget 
requirements nor limits to annual deficits are included. The fiscal rule also does not deal with 
the revenue side of the government budget and does not force a balanced budget during 
downturns. From here, the main technical work in setting the limits, as well as 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasting and monitoring, is carried out by the Ministry of 
Finance, reflecting the shortcoming indicated in the table on independent institutions of 
chapter four (table 8). The decline of the medium-term budgetary framework strength can be 
related to the use of escape clauses initiated by the deterioration of the economic environment 
caused by the financial crisis. This framework is furthermore not legally binding, and thus 
rests on the commitment of the government.236 Despite these shortcomings, the expenditure 
framework has ensured sufficient discipline and central government expenditures have been 
under control. Furthermore, the providence of macroeconomic projection by the Ministry of 
Finance have been proven to be prudent without negative budget surprises. 237   
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5.1.6: Challenges for the future and policy considerations. 
The main ingredient for Finland’s fiscal performance thus rests on the strength of political 
commitment between coalitions formed in the beginning of the new parliamentary term, 
complimented with a fiscal rule determining central government expenditures in combination 
with a multiannual framework. A budget balance rule is not in place. It would therefore be 
advisable to complement the existing expenditure ceilings with a budget balance rule 
formalised in legislation that can provide a robust correction mechanism in the case of an 
economic downturn.238  
 Unfortunately, this is currently the case in Finland, experiencing ever more difficult 
external circumstances, putting pressure on the political commitments who are most important 
for the formulation of the budget. As 2015 entails new elections for the Finnish government, 
polls indicate that an increase of dichotomy within the future coalition might be on the 
horizon, reflecting the current poor economic environment and a will to set aside current 
policy measures.239 The need for stronger fiscal rules is therefore desirable.  
 Lastly, it will be hard for a new government to spend its way out of the recession. 
Government debt- and deficit levels are approaching the EU limits.240 Further structural 
reforms are therefore needed and macroeconomic indicators need to be precisely monitored. 
Although the Ministry of Finance has a good history in the providence of these indicators, 
dispersed coalitions might put pressure on the deficit biases. An independent institution on the 
providence of macroeconomic projections and budgeting forecasts can therefore contribute to 
long-term stability, which is currently at stake. As J. Vartianinen, head of the Finnish 
Government Institute of Economic Research, states to Reuters in April of 2015; ‘’ We are not 
Greece but we are on the way there, that is quite shameful for a Nordic country."241 
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Chapter 5.2: Greece 
It is been generally acknowledged that a root-cause of the current Greek crisis was not only 
the deterioration of its fiscal position, but also the opacity of public accounts.242 Since the 
introduction of the Euro in Greece (2001) there have been several revisions of the government 
debt- and deficit levels. In October of 2009, the new government announces that the 2009 
budget deficit was actually 12.9 percent, more than double the previously announced 
figure.243 As a consequence, due to the erosion on credibility, financial markets reacted with a 
huge increase in Greek government bonds that made borrowing by the Greek state 
impossible.244 In what way can we link the negative budgetary outcomes of Greece with the 
strength of their domestic fiscal framework? 
5.2.1: The fiscal framework of Greece until 1993.  
According to Alogoskoufis (1995), member of the Hellenic Parliament from September 1996 
until October 2009, the post-war Greek economy had displayed two faces like the Roman god 
Janus. Prior to 1974, economic growth was second only to Japan among the OECD countries, 
with inflation rates at or below those of its partners. As Greece moved from a dictatorship to 
democracy in 1974, growth rates began to slow and inflation shot up 15-20 percent.245 Greek 
fiscal policy was mainly driven by political considerations until 1990. Government budgets 
were therefore subjected to little discipline and deficits and government debt soared.246 When 
the Maastricht Treaty was signed, fiscal aggregates were far from satisfying any of the 
criteria. The General Government deficit stood at 11.5 percent at the end of 1991 and the 
government debt was 83.3 percent and rising.247 
 The adjustment to the terms of Maastricht was going to be difficult. First, there was a 
greater need for fiscal discipline. In the cabinet under the first Papandreou government (1981-
1989), the individual ministries made proposals for their budgets. The balance of power thus 
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represented a classic case of fiefdom.248 Stronger ministers represented the big spending 
ministries such as defence, health and education. Although there was a minister of finance 
present in the cabinet, he was generally considered as the tenth or eleventh most powerful 
minister in the government.249 Budgets were therefore subjected to little discipline. This 
resulted in a government spending that was significantly higher than the average of the four 
most comparable EU Member States (Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain). 250 In addition, there 
was a pronounced political fiscal cycle. In election years politicians increased spending and 
revenue growth decreased. The latter can be explained due to the fact that taxpayers realised 
that tax laws were not enforced in election years. 
The Greek government and their policies could further be described as inefficient. The 
labour market relied on the government on the providence of jobs (the number of jobs rose 
with an average of 2.29 percent per year in contrast to only 0.55 percent in the balance of the 
economy) whereas the wages were particularly high (spending on public employees 
accounted for 12.7 percent of GDP, ranking just behind Denmark and Finland). Also, schemes 
like the social security system were highly complex, inefficient and inequitable.251 These 
inefficiencies where also visible on the revenue side, where the Greek government relied 
heavily on tax. Here, compliance has long been a problem for Greece’s revenue 
administrators.252  
This latter problem has been a paradox of Greek governance. While Greece has shifted 
from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic structure, the political culture is 
traditionally marked by clientelism, rent-seeking and corruption. This culture has put a severe 
constraint on reform initiatives, particularly on politically sensitive issues, such as reforms on 
pension, health or labour systems. Major parties have been accused in a succession of 
scandals, and there is a long history of corruption with favours.253 
Fortunately for Greece, 1993 marked a turning point in Greek economic and European 
policy. The climate for enhancing fiscal discipline improved.254 Two factors were in particular 
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important. First, when a new government came into office in 1993, it became increasingly 
evident that past economic policies had failed. The new ruling socialist party (PASOK) 
therefore gave up old fashion Keynesian style policy. Second, due to a high popularity of the 
idea that Greece could participate in the EMU and a dominant pro-European sentiment, policy 
change became easier to bare.255  
5.2.2: How did Greece manage to reach the Maastricht criteria?   
With a new socialist government in 1993, a first phase of convergent policy was initiated 
(1994-1997). The introduced policy mix however, can be characterized as inconsistent and 
inappropriate.256 Budget centralization did not occur due to a chronically ill prime minister 
(A. Papandreou).257 The government started with an adjustment policy that was based on 
higher tax revenues, high interest rates and a real devaluation of the Drachma. Still, on the 
other hand, the government continued with its expansionary income policy and did not cut 
real consumptive public expenditures. Also, structural reforms necessary to improve the 
supply-side of the economy were postponed. While there was some improvement in the 
macroeconomic performance, the policy mix was incapable to bring Greece in line with the 
convergence criteria of Maastricht.258 
 After three years A. Papandreou was replaced by K. Simitis who pledged to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Simitis merged the responsibility of the ministries of Economy and 
Finance under one person, Y. Papantoniou. On paper, this new minister now had the final 
word on all ministry budgets and thus could make cuts in spending where necessary. He 
started by freezing public wages, cuts on subsidies and was set out to close loopholes that 
allowed individual ministries to overspend their assigned budgets. Most importantly, he also 
started enforcing taxes. This resulted in a revenue increase of personal taxes which increased 
with 20 percent in 1997 and another 27 percent in 1998. The increase in tax revenues was also 
visible on the corporate income tax, increasing with an impressive 57 percent in 1998.259 
Lastly, the Greek central bank was granted independence, thereby fulfilling one of the EMU 
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requirements. At the same time, the Drachma was further devaluated with 12.3 percent 
relative to the European Currency Unit (ECU).260 
 On paper, the consolidation efforts seemed to work. The budget deficit was brought 
back to -4.0 percent in comparison with -10.1 percent in 1995. In 1998, the budget deficit was 
comfortably below the convergence criteria of Maastricht.261 The debt ratio also declined to 
104.4 percent, and although this was strictly not under the reference value, it was confirmed 
as ‘sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace’.262 
Inflation also fell from 23.3 per cent in 1990 to 3.9 percent in 2000 due to the ’hard drachma’ 
policy.263 Consequently, the European Commission and European Central Bank concluded 
that Greece fulfilled the convergence criteria by the spring of 2000.264  
 Nevertheless, although it seemed that the consolidation policies were successful, the 
Greek government admitted in 2004 that deficit figures were manipulated.265 Although M. 
Hallerberg (2004) speaks of a certain ‘Maastricht effect’ in the case of Greece266, he did not 
foresee that the political imperative to join the euro were so strong, that the Greek government 
engaged in fraud and ‘creative accounting’ in order to meet the criteria as soon as possible.267 
It is therefore difficult to assess whether or not the improvements of the fiscal policy were 
genuine. But the Greek example was not unique. As it turned out, several countries like 
France, Italy and Germany all engaged in different forms of creative accounting in order to 
polish up fiscal results.268  
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5.2.3: Did fiscal governance in Greece improve after the implementation of the Euro? 
As Greece adopted the euro on the first of January 2001, GDP growth started to pick up speed 
(see figure 3). Still, fiscal imbalances were never effectively brought under control. The most 
fundamental reason has been the weak institutional framework of budgeting and tax 
administration.269 As fiscal consolidation started to lose momentum in the Eurozone after the 
implementation of the Euro, Greece engaged in its old tradition of expansionary fiscal policy. 
Although Greece’s real GDP expanded at an average of 4.2 percent between 2000 and 2007, it 
was mainly driven by a rapid increase in domestic demand whereas the overall contribution of 
the external sector being on average, negative.270 The results of the expansionary fiscal policy 
over the first years of the SGP can be seen in the deficit tables 3 and 5 of chapter two, where 
Greek deficits surpassed the reference value continuously during the SGP period.  
So how can the high deficits of Greece be explained? Most important, it’s because of 
the incompetence of the government to control expenditures and to collect budget revenues.  
The Greek fiscal system had a poor mechanism of setting up the budget and lacked systematic 
monitoring of its implementation, despite the minor institutional reforms of the 1990’s.271 
According to the OECD (2008); ‘’ As in many countries, the Greek budget lacks strong top-
down procedures, does not cover all government expenses, and has a very detailed input 
focus.’’272    
The Greek budget preparation was to a large extent a bottom-up exercise, where 
ministries enjoy a large decree of freedom to propose spending wishes with little incentives to 
reallocate or prioritize spending.273Although the parliament has a powerful constitutional role 
in voting the state budget (also by Ministry), mechanisms to follow up budgetary execution 
and monitor developments on public expenditures and revenues were not in place. Also 
information about healthcare, the social security system and local government appeared only 
in a fragmented manner or was largely missing.274 Coherent information systems that enable 
the production of detailed overviews regarding the total public revenues and –expenditures 
were absent, resulting in the lack of a unitary budget. As of 2009, the government budget was 
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based on some 14.000 separate ‘budget lines’ where each line represented grouped items of 
expenditure within parts of the public administration.275 
Second, the government consistently based its fiscal forecasts on an optimistic outlook 
for the whole economy. Although a fiscal institution was established in 1959 (The Centre of 
Planning and Economic Research, KEPE), it did not had a formal role in the budgetary 
process. The government does not use the outputs and does not have to justify departures 
from KEPE’s forecasts and assessments.276 Thirdly, the government drafted the budget in 
November for the following calendar year only. It therefore misses budget implications that 
go beyond the yearly budgetary cycle. A medium-term budgetary framework therefore did not 
exist in Greece until 2010.277  
Lastly, Greece has poor preforming tax administration mechanisms in place. 
Widespread tax evasions are common, therefore missing additional revenues. Much of the tax 
reforms that are introduced year by year usually involve changes of tax rates and tax bases, 
while structural weaknesses of the tax administration system remain intact.278  Consequently, 
budget revenues did not its way into the public purse, while expenditures were not kept under 
control. Government revenue forecasts were inflated and expenditures underestimated. This 
was a consequence of the weak institutional framework.279 As G. Kaplanoglou and V.T 
Rapanos (2011) write: ‘’ Greece is a prime example of how poor fiscal governance, if 
combined with other negative factors such as the instability of global financial markets, can 
indeed lead an economy to the brink of financial collapse and at the same time create a 
systemic problem for a common-currency area as a whole.’’280 
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Figure 3: Greece’s GDP growth rate, 2000-2014. 
 
Source: Tradingeconomics, tradingeconomics.com/greece/gdp-growth-annual, consulted at 22-04-2015.  
 
5.2.4: Reforms after the outbreak of the financial crisis 
The financial crisis pushed Greece far beyond the limits of the SGP. With an overall fiscal 
deficit of 15.5 percent and a public debt of nearly 130 per cent at end-2009, Greece had no 
option but to undertake a sizeable adjustment when capital inflows that financed them came to 
a sudden stop in early 2010.281 Still, despite the challenging economic and financial situation, 
Greece’s fiscal framework remains underdeveloped.282  This does not mean however that 
structural reforms were absent after the outbreak of the financial crisis. A reform impetus has 
been created that has been particularly strong in the euro area countries that asked for 
assistance from the ECB and the IMF. Some of the following measures can therefore be 
linked to the obtained financial assistance.283 The fact that Greece’s fiscal framework remains 
under-developed can be contributed to the complexity of the current institutional framework 
and the time-consuming progress of reforms, especially considering the high dynamic 
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electoral situation in Greece which creates a highly volatile environment that makes it 
difficult for any government to complete reforms.284  
 A substantial reform effort was introduced with the passing of Law 3871/2010 on 
‘’Fiscal Management and Responsibility’’. First, this new law has introduced a medium-term 
budgetary framework (three-year) for the central and general government. The framework 
includes detailed fiscal targets, a reference to the use of macroeconomic assumptions on 
which fiscal forecasts have to be based, multiannual targets, etc. Secondly, a new top-down 
approach has been introduced for public expenditure. The Ministry of Finance will be able to 
impose a ceiling on the expenditure of ministries, local authorities and on social budgets.285 
These bodies are now required to draft annual budgets and communicate with the General 
Budget Accounting Office on a monthly basis. From here, the General Budget Accounting 
Office have to submit to the Parliament and press in order to enhance transparency.286 
Thirdly, new laws are implemented on the reform of the Social Security System (Law 
3863/2010), National Health System (Law 3868/2010) and the Local Government and 
Regional Administration (Law 3852/2010), which should contribute to further cost savings.287  
 However, despite the considerable progress, important challenges and risks are still 
ahead with regard to the achievement of fiscal targets. Most importantly, this is a consequence 
of the lower than expected collection of revenues, mostly due to tax evasion. N. Artavanis 
et.al. (2015) write; ‘’ Using individual-level household-lending data across diﬀerent credit 
products and samples, we conservatively estimate that at least 28 billion euros of income 
went untaxed in Greece for 2009. At the tax rate of 40%, the foregone tax revenues account 
for 32% of the county’s deﬁcit.’’288 It is therefore necessary to reform the tax mechanism, 
especially with regard to combating tax evasion.289 Although some reform measures have 
been implemented since the financial crisis, this problem is still very vivid in the Greek 
economy.290 Key indicators on tax administration have improved in 2013 relative to 2012, but 
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are still falling short of the targets due to political interference in operations and a slow roll-
out of reforms to local tax offices.291   
 Further progress should also be aimed at the establishment of Fiscal Council or an 
Office of Fiscal Responsibility. Although Law 4270/2014 foresees the creation of an 
independent fiscal watchdog, it is never been activated and remains inoperative due to the 
lacking of management or staff.292 This should further complement fiscal information on local 
governments as this remains very limited. Although the government has set expenditure 
ceilings for the state and deficit targets for various government sectors, there is still a lack of 
an adequate monitoring of intra-year budgetary developments for the government as a 
whole.293 Lastly, there are currently no fiscal rules in Greece, which explains the (relatively) 
low score on the Fiscal Rule Index of chapter four. The small increase of this indicator can be 
contributed to the implemented MTBF with some binding ceilings on the expenditure side. 
Still, fiscal rules like a revenue rule for the general government are not in place.294 
 This is also the case for structural reforms, especially on the supply side. As the Greek 
economy boomed in the first decennium of the 2000’s, real wage growth has consistently 
outpaced productivity gains, resulting in an eroded external competitiveness. Currently 
Greece is lagging behind on productivity enhancing reforms. Due to the political turmoil in 
2011-2012, adjustment has been through recessionary channels (compression of real spending 
and income) rather than productivity gains. As a consequence, price declines in Greece have 
not been proportional with wage declines, reflecting rigidities in product and service 
markets.295 Excessive restrictions remain that raise the cost of doing business and inhibit the 
establishment or expansion of larger firms, the minimum wage system is still problematic, and 
collective dismissals are de facto not allowed.296 In sum, Greece should put a greater 
emphasis in bolstering the competitiveness and flexibility of the economy.   
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Chapter 5.3: Conclusion  
In this chapter, two Member States are picked for an in-depth review according to the 
compliance results of chapter two. Here, Finland can be picked as a well-behaved Member 
State whereas Greece can be picked as a wrongdoer.  
 The ‘Finnish miracle’ can be contributed to the strong commitment of governments to 
follow-up a consistent consolidation policy as well as a set of relatively successful structural 
reform measures. As the Finnish economy experienced a severe recession in the beginning of 
the 1990’s which can be summarized as ‘’a tale of bad luck and bad policies’’, the Finnish 
government of 1995 chased a new consolidation policy connected with both institutional- and 
structural reforms. From here, Finland followed an atypical pattern of industrial development 
transitioning from a nature-resource based economy into one that relies heavily on high 
technology and knowledge. Reforms were also implemented with regard to the Finnish fiscal 
framework.  As from the 1990’s, Finland had implemented a MTBF setting spending targets 
for individual ministers. Also lower governments in practice adhered to a balanced budget, 
reflecting a strong commitment-based government apparatus.  
 The current fiscal framework of Finland has been established in 2003 and is anchored 
around multi-annual expenditure ceilings, mirroring the previous fiscal framework of 1991. 
Although several elements that form a resilient fiscal framework were not in place, results 
suggests that governments tend to abide by the rules. This latter conclusion however may also 
be a fundamental weakness to the Finnish fiscal framework. As a consequence of an 
unfavourable external environment, Finland is currently undergoing an economic slowdown. 
This in combination with a shifting and volatile political landscape makes it questionable if 
the reliance on political commitment is sufficient enough to be sustainable on the long run. It 
is therefore advisable to complement the current fiscal framework with additional fiscal rules 
as well as an independent fiscal forecaster in order to enhance correctional- and monitoring 
mechanisms. Lastly, as a consequence of a lacking productivity growth, an ageing society and 
a decrease of competitiveness, structural reform measures should be implemented in order to 
boost economic growth.  
 Whereas Finland relies on a strong political commitment, the opposite is true for 
Greece. As Greece transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy, the institutional 
framework mirrored a classic case of fiefdom. Greek fiscal policy was mainly driven by 
political considerations, resulting in overspending ministries and an ineffective down-top 
86 
 
approach on budgeting. Although some reform measures where undertaken on the road to the 
Euro, the government revealed that the Maastricht criteria were satisfied through fraud and 
‘creative accounting’. After the implementation of the Euro, the Greek government returned 
to its old course of expansionary fiscal policy while macroeconomic imbalances where 
persistent. The financial crisis exposed the unsustainable fiscal position of Greece, resulting in 
a sudden stop of capital inflows. As bankruptcy suddenly came closer, a reform impetus was 
created as Greece sought financial assistance. Greece had no other option but to undertake a 
sizeable adjustment.  
 Since then, several reform measures have been implemented in Greece. As from 2010, 
a medium-term budgetary framework is in place, setting multiannual targets for the 
government. Furthermore, a new top-down approach on budgeting is implemented, where 
expenditure ceilings have created for individual ministries and local governments as well as 
cost-saving policies for healthcare, the social security system and regional administration. 
Unfortunately, Greece’s fiscal framework still remains under-developed. This can be 
contributed to the complexity of the institutional framework, the time-consuming progress on 
reforms and the current highly volatile political landscape. Current challenges lie in reforming 
the tax mechanism and structural reforms which are currently difficult to accomplish. The 
same is applicable for the implementation complementary fiscal rules and an independent 
Fiscal Council or Office of Fiscal Responsibility. Although for the latter an implementation 
law was passed in 2014, it is never been activated and remains inoperative due to the lacking 
of management or staff.  
 The case-studies of Finland and Greece adds strength to the outlined theory of the 
political economy of M. Hallerberg and co-authors, arguing for an appropriate budgeting 
procedure according to the country’s political system. Successful periods of consolidation in 
Finland can be contributed to the strong commitment of politicians to abide by the rules, an 
early implemented MTBF with strong characteristics and a successive implementation of 
structural reforms which turned Finland from a country that relied on natural exports, to a 
country with a high skilled labour force and efficient tech-industry. The exact opposite is true 
for Greece. Here, fiscal policy was mainly driven by politics resulting in overspending 
ministries without a sufficient form of centralization of the budget. Although Hallerberg 
argues that Greece moved in the late 1990’s from fiefdom to a delegation form of fiscal 
governance, the financial crisis has showed that a resilient fiscal framework is needed to be 
sustainable in the long run. This is both relevant for Greece and Finland. The financial crisis 
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might have an impact on the reliance of commitment in Finland, which makes the 
implementation of additional fiscal rules and a strong independent fiscal institution desirable. 
For Greece, the implementation of strong austerity measures imposed by its current financial 
lenders, have also contributed to a volatile environment. Although this might also indicate a 
well-functioning democracy, additional fiscal instruments will protect Greece for mistakes 
made in the past. A reform impetus might be created after the financial crisis, but it remains to 
be seen if current reform measures and those of the future will be continued in order to 
enhance Greece’s economic and fiscal position within the monetary union of Europe.  
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Chapter 6: General summary  
 
Throughout the SGP-period, member states have been showing mixed results with regard to 
the fiscal rules stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht. Although the fear of not being allowed 
to take part of the Euro was enough to create a consolidation impetus, this positive effect 
evaporated after the implementation of the SGP and the Euro. Consequently, the  Pact has 
been reformed several times to address its flaws. Still, many member states adopted the 
requirements of the SGP on the surface while maintaining the legacy of past fiscal profligacy, 
weak domestic fiscal frameworks and the engagement in creative accounting and ‘one-offs’. 
The consequences thereof can be seen in the aftermath of the financial crisis, where several 
countries now face painful austerity measures and structural reforms in order to prevent 
defaulting on a domestic level and the collapse of current the monetary system as a whole. 
 This research is aimed at providing answers on the question why member states have 
been showing mixed results under the same external constraints. Starting by analysing the 
results of the past, two explicit structural patterns of wrongdoers have emerged in the 
literature. During the first years of the SGP, especially the large countries (France, Germany 
and Italy) have shown non-compliance with the SGP criteria. This was also noticed by the 
European Commission in 2003, and they therefore advised the ECOFIN Council to start its 
corrective arm in order to correct their behaviour. The ECOFIN Council ignored the advice, 
mirroring a loss of credibility of the Pact due to the considerable political influence of these 
large countries. As a result of this ‘compliance crisis’, the Pact was reformed in 2005, 
introducing even greater discretion, leniency and political control into the procedures.297 
When the financial crisis hit, member states were ‘distinctly ill-prepared’. Public finances 
started to worsen over the whole Euro area. This was especially the case for a second group of 
wrongdoers, conspicuously called ‘the PIIGS’, an acronym for Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, 
Greece and Spain.  
 So why should the large countries have difficulties adhering to the rules of the SGP? 
The literature provides numerous reasons. Large countries have higher consolidation costs, 
experience slower economic growth, are less susceptible to peer pressure and have more 
bargaining power. While the political ownership of the SGP shifted to the smaller countries 
over time, they still had little influence with their peers. Moreover, small countries are more 
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accustomed to peer pressure and political influence. They tend to suffer more from 
reputational costs and imposed fines when they do not comply. Also, high growth volatility 
and lower consolidation costs usually results in a stronger fiscal discipline. Over time, smaller 
countries performed better under the SGP than the large ones. 
 In contrary to the large countries, the PIIGS decided to replicate the fiscal policies of 
their more prosperous member partners rather than adjusting in real terms. The PIIGS were 
plagued with macroeconomic imbalances, slow economic growth rates, a loss of 
competitiveness and productivity, and rigid labour markets. Although the underlying root 
causes for their problems tend to differ between these member states, the all had one thing in 
common, an out of control expansion of government debt. They furthermore, just like their 
counterparts, engaged in creative accounting and ‘one-offs’ while maintaining procyclical 
fiscal policies.  
 The financial crisis has exposed fundamental weaknesses on a domestic institutional 
level. As a result, the SGP has been reformed again in order to tackle initial gaps in the EMU 
architecture. The first set of reforms entered into force at the end of 2011, also known as the 
‘Six-Pack’ followed by a ‘Two-Pack’ and a ‘Fiscal compact’. Where the SGP reform of 2005 
called for increasing flexibility, these new set of rules are aimed at strengthening the 
adherence to the SGP trough the improvement of monitoring tools and EU’s economic 
governance rules in order to reinforce economic coordination between member states. Still, 
scholars remain sceptical, especially regarding the seeming unwillingness of member states to 
transfer the necessary degree of sovereignty over macro-fiscal objectives to the European 
level. As it turned out, ‘’ important flanking policies to the fiscal exit will include 
strengthened national budgetary frameworks for underpinning the credibility of consolidation 
strategies and measures to support long-term fiscal sustainability.’’298 
 This raises the following question; can we relate the mixed compliance outcomes 
under the SGP with the strength of domestic fiscal frameworks? In the end, the literature 
stipulates a ‘plethora of interrelated factors that can all act to feed the deficit bias and generate 
suboptimal fiscal policy’. European governments are all prone to deficit and debt biases that 
are likely to emanate from the democratic political process. Main root causes are the common 
pool problem, the use of pro-cyclical fiscal policies and the political cycle of a country, who 
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can all feed the deficit and debt bias. Fortunately, research have also provided us with number 
of instruments and solutions to this problem. 
  Starting with an institutional approach derived from the theoretical political economy, 
von Hagen and co-authors argue that a decentralized or fragmented policy process leads to 
weaker fiscal discipline than a centralized one. The solution for a co-ordination problem in 
domestic budgetary procedures it thus ‘centralization’. In order to achieve this, M. Hallerberg 
(2004) argues that political institutions are highly relevant. According to the electoral system, 
countries should engage in a ‘delegation’, ‘contract’ or ‘mixed’ form of governance, where 
countries using the contract form of governance, usually are associated with better compliance 
outcomes with the SGP. This is because in the contract approach, governments negotiate a 
‘fiscal contract’ involving strict budget targets, thereby ‘fitting snugly’ with the SGP.  
Unfortunately, besides the work of von Hagen and co-authors, there is little research on the 
choice of governance. I therefore put an emphasis on the following instruments: 
1) Independent forecasters: These institutions are regarded as promising by the literature. 
They can be the first line of defence against overly optimistic growth assumptions, 
fraud and creative accounting, and can mark-up reputational costs by setting 
transparent benchmarks. From here, I consider three important channels in order to be 
effective. First, the provision of independent analysis on fiscal policy issues. Second, 
The provision of unbiased inputs for the annual budget preparation. Most importantly, 
macroeconomic forecasts on which budgetary projections are based. And last, the 
issuing of regular assessments and recommendations relating to different aspects of 
fiscal policy. The use of independent forecasters is currently monitored by the 
European Commission.  
2) County-specific numerical fiscal rules: Fiscal rules can provide a permanent constraint 
on fiscal policy and come in the following forms; budgetary balance rules, debt rules, 
expenditure- and revenue rules. Here, one of the most promising forms of fiscal rules 
are expenditure rules. These rules in particular have received increasing attention both 
by literature as well as the European Commission. The use of these rules is also 
monitored by the European Commission and compressed in an index for each Member 
State (FRI). The FRI is thus a single comprehensive score per country per year. 
3) The use of a medium term budgetary framework (MTBF): Since a single year 
perspective provides a poor basis for fiscal planning, MTBFs can contribute to long 
term sustainable fiscal planning. This instrument can help to governments to extend 
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the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond the annual budgetary calendar. Although 
this is a fairly new concept, the use of a MTBF is currently required by EU law, and 
monitored in a MTBF strength-index. 
4) Structural reforms: The economic crisis highlighted the existence of an important 
interaction in a monetary union between fiscal and structural policies at national level. 
Currently, the EU is facing slow economic growth, competitiveness problems and a 
deterioration of productivity levels. Here, supply-side policies can be especially 
effective in increasing the effectiveness of demand-side policies and help empower 
demand. Key indicators are therefore employment barriers and barriers to 
entrepreneurship. The OECD reports annually on these indicators in their ‘Going for 
Growth’ report.  
In this research I have analysed the strength of these instruments based on summarizing 
indicators and whether or not they coincide with the structural results found in chapter two. 
The hypothesis is thus that wrongdoers should show weaker indicators on these instruments 
than their better preforming counterparts. Regarding the use of independent institutions, fiscal 
rules and MTBF’s, I found that especially the PIIGS show relatively weak domestic fiscal 
frameworks. Between these countries, especially Greece is currently facing difficulties. After 
its transition to democracy in the 1970’s, Greek fiscal policy was mainly driven by political 
considerations, resulting in overspending ministries and an ineffective down-top approach on 
budgeting thus representing a classic case of fiefdom. As the rest of the PIIGS, Greece relaxed 
its fiscal policies after the implementation of the Euro. It furthermore engaged in fraud and 
creative accounting in order to reveal rising levels of government debt and deficits. Not being 
sustainable in the long run, Greece had to admit forgery, sparking a succession of violent 
shocks spread out over the European continent. 
In contrary, the small countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden) show relatively strong scores. Finland and Luxembourg however remain outsiders. 
Luxembourg is still missing a MTBF whereas Finland lacked an independent fiscal forecaster 
until recently. This latter observation is especially odd, since Finland can be considered as one 
of the best preforming countries in the EMU. Still, according to the in-depth review, this 
success can be contributed to a firm MTBF implemented in the 1990’s and the strong 
commitment of politicians to abide by the rules. The large countries showed mixed indicators, 
although Italy stands out. Where this country can also be associated with the PIIGS, Italy is 
the third largest economy in the euro zone. During the SGP-period Italy scored relatively 
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weak on the use of independent forecasters and fiscal rules in comparison with its large- and 
small counterparts.  
Now that the dust of the financial crisis is currently clearing up, especially the southern 
countries are facing structural difficulties with their economies in general. The key indicators 
on structural reforms however show mixed results between all the groups. In the small 
countries, Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg all score relatively weak with regard to the 
OECD benchmark. The fact that structural reforms are also needed in the small countries is 
further exemplified by Finland. Due to globalization, Finland is currently facing more 
competition with regard to its tech-sector. It furthermore has to deal with an increasing ageing 
society, a lower productivity, high wages, a relatively high unemployment and an old-
fashioned pension system. Structural reforms may be solution for long-term sustainability as it 
will be hard for a new government to spend its way out of the recession. 
Between the large countries, especially France and Italy are still showing high levels of 
employment protection legislation and high administrative burdens to start-ups. Comparative 
levels can be seen for the PIIGS, although Ireland is relatively flexible. This ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
implemented a wide range of policies to foster productivity in the second part of the 20th 
century. As a result, Irish productivity growth consistently outpaced other advanced 
economies from the 1970’s onwards. Still, while Irelands pre-Tiger supply policies may have 
been effective, it still lacked macroeconomic stabilization policies, turning them from a 
‘Tiger’ into one of the PIIGS.299 
So can we explain the mixed outcomes under the SGP by looking at the strength of 
domestic fiscal framework? Yes and no. This hypothesis can be confirmed for the PIIGS 
whereas the small countries show a more resilient framework in general. In almost all of the 
PIIGS, domestic fiscal frameworks were weak before the outbreak of the financial crisis. The 
in-depth review of Greece describes the consequences in detail. This case is a prime example 
on how a lack of constraint for policy makers and an inappropriate institutional setting, results 
in an increasing debt- and deficit bias while not being sustainable on the long run. 
However, outcomes tend to be mixed between the large and the small countries. Within 
the large countries, Italy can be framed as a wrongdoer. Although Italy is also commonly 
referred to as one of the PIIGS, this hypothesis faces difficulties in explaining divergent 
                                                             
299 K. Whelan, ‘’ Ireland’s economic crisis: The good, the bad and the ugly’’, UCD centre of economic research 
working paper series WP 13/06 (2013), 2. 
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results of the other large countries. Both France, Germany and the UK have (almost) equally 
implemented fiscal rules, independent institutions and MTBF’s, showing only marginal 
differences between the small countries. Thus, in order to explain the divergent results of the 
large countries, we must also focus on other explanations provided by the literature such as 
higher consolidation costs, political ownership etc.  
Within the small countries, the hypothesis seems to apply more for the Nordic countries 
including the Netherlands and Luxembourg (although the latter is still missing a MTBF). Still, 
Belgium and Austria are definite outsiders, who can mainly be characterized by high 
government debt levels. In general, they have scored above average on the tested indicators. 
This is especially true for Belgium, who scores well on the fiscal rule indicator from the 
beginning of the 1990’s onwards to the implementation of the Euro. From there, Belgium 
started to lose ground in comparison with the EU-average. Can this be contributed to 
adjustment fatigue due to Maastricht? Austria on the other side, scores relatively low on the 
fiscal rule indicator although it also had an independent fiscal forecaster and MTBF in place.  
Lastly, due to the existing degree of political integration in the EMU, is internal 
adjustment rather than attempting to re-design the rules from scratch a more suitable way to 
bring about progress? Here, the answer is also ambivalent. The indicators on domestic fiscal 
frameworks show that since the implementation of budgetary rules on an EU-level, individual 
scores have increased. Furthermore, due to the financial crisis, the European landscape is 
becoming more volatile, which might have an impact on member states relying on 
commitment to abide by the rules. When commitment start to fail, fiscal instruments will be 
needed to constrain policy makers. Still, rules on a European level tend to be non-specific. 
Instruments need to be stipulated according to criteria as cited by Kopits and Symansky in 
order to be effective. This however, will be difficult. As L. Schuknecht et.al (2011) write: ‘’ 
The latest reforms continue to reﬂect Member States’ unwillingness to transfer the necessary 
degree of sovereignty over macro-ﬁscal objectives to the European level.’’  
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